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Abstract
In this study we analyze the competitive eects of cooperation between
competitors in the form of subcontracting and the influence of informa-
tion, production and capacity on market structure and competition.Three
game-theoretic models are developed to evaluate rms’s strategies and the
competitive eects of information sharing and production sharing. They are
motivated by and applied to a case study of the flat glass market in order to
evaluate the restrictive policy ofthe European Commission.The models an-
alyze the eects of subcontracting and exchange agreements on information
sharing, capacity decisions and production decisions. Welfare eects with
and without subcontracting are then being compared. In a horizontal sub-
contracting model rst signalling via subcontracting and secondly the eects
on product variety and capacity decisions are being analyzed. In an exchange
agreement model cooperation between competitors with dierent eciency
levels is being studied. The results show that technology and market char-
acteristics determine whether subcontracting between competitors increases
or decreases welfare. The market is able to develop mechanisms such as sig-
nalling via subcontracting to overcome ineciencies but competition policy
should stay attentive while allowing for a rule-of-reason.
Keywords:
competition, competition policy, European competition policy, information
sharing, signalling, signaling, exchange agreement, protection sharing, sub-
contracting, capacity, capacity sharing, glass market, flat glass market
Zusammenfassung
In dieser Arbeit wird eine wettbewerbspolitische Beurteilung der Zusammen-
arbeit von Wettbewerbern in Form von Querlieferungen vorgenommen und
der Einflu von Information, Produktion und Kapazita¨t auf Marktstruktur
und Wettbewerb analysiert.In drei spieltheoretischen Modellen werden die
Unternehmensstrategien und die wettbewerblichen Eekte von Informati-
onsaustausch und Produktionsaustausch untersucht. Sie wurden motiviert
und werden angewandt auf eine Entscheidung zum Europa¨ischen Flachglas-
markt, um die restriktive Wettbewerbspolitik der Europa¨ischen Kommissi-
on zu beurteilen. Die Modelle untersuchen die Auswirkungen von Quer-
lieferungen und Austauschvereinbarungen auf Informationsaustausch, Kapa-
zita¨tsentscheidungen und Produktionsentscheidungen. Dabei wird die Wohl-
fahrt mit und ohne Querlieferungen verglichen. In einem Modell mit hori-
zontalen Querlieferungen werden erstens Signalling via Querlieferungen und
zweitens die Auswirkungen auf Produktvielfalt und Kapazita¨tsentscheidungen
analysiert. In einem Modell mit Austauschvereinbarungen wird die Koopera-
tion zwischen unterschiedlich ezienten Wettbewerbern untersucht.Die Er-
gebnisse zeigen, dass die Technologie und Marktcharakteristika festlegen, ob
Querlieferungen zwischen Wettbewerbern die Wohlfahrt erho¨ht oder redu-
ziert. Der Markt ist in der Lage, Mechanismen wie z.B. Signalling via Quer-
lieferungen zu entwickeln, um Inezienzen zu mildern. Die Wettbewerbspo-
litik sollte aufmerksam bleiben, aber eine rule-of-reason zulassen.
Sclagwo¨rter:
Wettbewerb, Wettbewerbspolitik, Europa¨ische Wettbewerbspolitik, Austausch-
vereinbarung, Informationsaustausch, Signalling, Signaling, Querlieferung,
Produktaustausch, Subcontracting, Kapazita¨tsentscheidungen, Glasmarkt,
Flachglasmarkt
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Chapter 1
Introduction
During the last decades the nature of competition has changed. For rms
the strategic interaction with competitors has become increasingly impor-
tant and more complex. Now even cooperation with rival rms might be
mutually benecial. Cooperation can take place in a variety of forms. Two
specic forms of cooperation, namely one-sided subcontracting in the form
of horizontal subcontracting and two-sided subcontracting, termed exchange
agreement, will be studied. In a horizontal subcontracting agreement one rm
buys or sells production to or from a rival rm even though each rm could
produce the product on its own. In an exchange agreement both rms buy
and sell to each other by agreeing upon an exchange ratio.
Two economic aspects, which are the focus of antitrust concern, will be
considered in detail: information sharing and production sharing. The com-
petitive assessment of these forms of cooperation is an open question. While
rms might achieve eciency gains from more accurate information and by
allocating production to the rm with lower production costs, the nature of
competition changes as well. Competition policy has to assess the trade-
o between eciency gains and potentially collusive behaviour which might
arise from better information or the division of markets through coordinated
product variety and capacity decisions. This study aims to analyze rms’
strategies and assess the competitive eects of cooperation between rival rms
which take place in the form of subcontracting.
Methodologically, game-theoretic models are developed to derive general
results. They were motivated by and are applied to a case study of the flat
glass market in order to evaluate the restrictive policy of the European Com-
mission towards these forms of cooperation expressed in decisions regarding
2
3this industry.
The results show that technology and market characteristics determine
whether subcontracting between competitors increases or decreases welfare.
The horizontal subcontracting model will be used to analyze information
sharing and production sharing, the exchange agreement model will focus
on production sharing. With respect to information sharing the results are
clear cut. First of all, it is possible to signal cost information via horizontal
subcontracting. And in contrast to models of market information systems
not only welfare and prots but also consumer surplus increases. If market
information systems are forbidden the market develops the mechanism "sig-
naling via subcontracting" in order to alleviate informational ineciencies.
Competition policy should take a favourable stand.
With respect to production sharing the results are more mixed. The an-
titrust fear is that of a division of markets established through the product
variety oered and the capacities choosen by rms. Both types of subcon-
tracting models will be considered.
First, a horizontal subcontracting model for the monopoly and the duopoly
case focuses on the capacity and product decisions resulting from the dynam-
ics of a growing demand. The results crucially depend on the relationship
between the technologically given plant size and the level of demand. Both
influence capacity utilization and thereby the willingness to subcontract and
the welfare eects. The introductory monopoly case illustrates that a monop-
olist does not increase his capacity at the welfare optimal level of demand.
Switching to higher capacity requires a higher than welfare optimal level of
demand because the monopolist does not internalize the benets from an
increase in consumer surplus. In the duopoly case, product and capacity
decisions change with subcontracting. Welfare might increase, in particular
if capacity constraints are binding but it is not yet, due to high xed costs,
protable for one rm to increase capacity on its own. Unfortunately, if
rms are of symmetric size, either the rms or the consumers benet but
never both. So competition policy would either have to accept that welfare
increases are split up unevenly or intervene. In the flat glass case this would
warrant attention to the practice of a company subcontracting products.
Secondly, the exchange agreement model shows that if rms have dier-
ent eciency levels, that is marginal costs, then an exchange of products
is benecial for rms and Pareto dominant for society when compared to a
situation without exchange agreement.
Both subcontracting models cover features of the flat glass market. In
4a case of horizontal subcontracting, which the European Commission for-
bid, the objections were based on the fear of anti-competitive information
sharing and production sharing. As the European Court reversed the Euro-
pean Commission’s decision without explicitly deciding on these objections,
the questions remain unresolved and the companies have grown hesitant to
openly engage in subcontracting agreements. The exchange agreement model
deals with a tacit practice in the industry.
Summarizing leads to the conclusion that the market is able to develop
means to overcome ineciencies on its own. Nevertheless, competition policy
should be attentive when welfare but not necessarily consumer surplus in-
creases. But rather than forbidding cooperation with a per-se rule anittrust
authorities should allow for a rule-of-reason.
The questions pursued can be illustrated with the help of the market
structure in gure 1. They have the common feature to focus on the influence
of incomplete input markets on intermediate or nal output markets with
regard to competition and welfare.
Input Market
Intermediate
Product
Market
Output Market
A
DC
E
B
r=x/y
x,y
s
t
Figure 1.1: Market structure
Input markets are incomplete due to incomplete information or technol-
ogy. For example, due to technology, only lumpy investments in capital-
5intensive plants with high xed costs and at given plant sizes might be pos-
sible. In addition, switching product lines on a given plant might incur
additional xed costs or increase marginal costs. Figure 1 shows a duopoly
with two rms, A and B, which produce two products, x and y.
In a horizontal subcontracting model, rms operate at the same horizontal
stage of the vertical supply chain of production and sell or buy a product
from a rival rm, even though each rm is capable of producing the product
independently. In gure 1, rm A unilaterally oers a transfer price t at
which it is is willing to subcontract (sell) the amount s of product x to rm
B. Firm B then sells this quantity on the market of product x and competes
directly against rm A.
In an exchange agreement model, rm A and rm B agree on an exchange
ratio r = x=y at which they bilaterally exchange quantities of the products.
The focus of interest is on the way in which changes in the cost structures
and more cost heterogeneity influence competition and welfare.
The study is organized as follows. References and reviews of the liter-
ature are dealt with in the respective chapters. Chapter II deals with the
question of information sharing. Is it possible to signal information through
subcontracting, and if this is the case, what welfare eects does this imply?
Chapter III turns to the question of production sharing through subcontract-
ing and introduces the monopoly model, where a monopolist faces capacity
decisions with lumpy investments. Chapter IV extends the analysis of pro-
duction sharing through subcontracting to a duopoly and determines the
equilibrium capacity and product variety decisions. Chapter V turns to an
exchange agreement model and determines the equilibrium exchange quan-
tities. Finally, chapter VI contains a description of the flat glass market.
Chapter 2
Signaling through
Subcontracting
2.1 Introduction
In a horizontal subcontracting agreement competing rms buy or sell produc-
tion to or from a rival rm even though each rm could produce the product
on its own. Two hypothesis have been advanced to explain this behaviour.
On the one hand it is straightforward that rms can achieve eciency gains if
production is allocated to the rm with lower production costs. On the other
hand this behaviour changes the nature of competition. This is the reason
why antitrust authorities consider subcontracting as a potentially collusive
device.
In Europe this is still an open question for competition policy. In partic-
ular, the European Commission has stated two fears. First, subcontracting
might lead to specialization and a division of market. This is analyzed in
the following chapters which focus on product variety and capacity decisions.
Secondly, subcontracting is regarded as a means to collusively share infor-
mation. The subcontracting price, at which one rm is willing to sell part of
its production to a competitor, might be used to signal information in order
to support collusion (see the flat glass case EC 1992 and European Court
1994).
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze if subcontracting can be used
to signal information and, if this is the case, how signaling through subcon-
tracting aects market behaviour and welfare. Subcontracting will be shown
6
7to be a credible way to convey private information and influence a rival’s
beliefs and competitive behaviour. Signaling costs will have to be borne by
the informed rm but they will not be socially wasteful because consumers
benet through lower prices. A discussion of the results will then be placed
in the broader context of how informational settings influence competition
and welfare. It is well known that in the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion market equilibria often fail to be Pareto optimal. Nevertheless, the
European Commission has been very critical of mechanisms such as infor-
mation sharing and subcontracting which developed in the marketplace and
which change the informational setting. Therefore, in order to reach policy
conclusions, the dierent mechanisms will be compared. Signaling through
subcontracting will be shown to be welfare enhancing and superior to in-
formation sharing through a market information system. Forbidding both
mechanisms is the worst case scenario. Instead, ineciencies due to informa-
tional asymmetry can be alleviated by a mechanism (subcontracting) which
develops in the marketplace on its own. Subcontracting makes it possible to
reach a constrained Pareto optimal allocation.
The signaling model focuses on the informational aspects of subcontract-
ing in the presence of asymmetric information. In a duopoly, one rm has
private information about its costs, which are either high or low. This in-
formed rm sets a subcontracting price at which it is willing to sell the prod-
uct to the uninformed rm. This price is observable and is a signal about
the unobservable private cost. Then both rms compete in the same market.
The uninformed rm has to decide how much to subcontract (buy) or pro-
duce on its own. The basic idea is that the informed rm will try to influence
the uninformed rm’s beliefs about its costs. The informed rm takes into
account two countervailing eects when choosing the subcontracting price:
an expectation and a subcontracting eect. On the one hand, the informed
rm’s prot increases if the other rm expects her to have low costs, i.e., a
low-cost rm has an incentive to set a low subcontracting price in order to
signal low costs. This can be a credible way of conveying information because
the rm is committed to sell at this price and misleading signaling could be
costly. A high-cost rm cannot protably mimick every low-cost rm’s price,
because the subcontracting (selling) price might be below production costs
and lead to losses. On the other hand, a low-cost rm is interested to sub-
contract (sell) the product at the highest possible price. As a result of this
trade-o between the expectation and subcontracting eect, there will be
either separating or pooling perfect Bayesian equilibria, depending on the
8cost realizations. Separating as well as pooling equilibria only exist in a very
small cost region, and here the renement of the "intuitive criterion" is not
able to help with equilibrium selection and elimination of the pooling equi-
libria. But in all other regions the renement of Pareto dominance will lead
to a unique separating equilibrium where rms noncollusively signal infor-
mation and welfare and consumer surplus increases. Welfare in the signaling
model will then be compared to welfare determined in the information shar-
ing model. A comparison leads to policy conclusions whether to allow or
forbid these mechanisms.
The related literature on information sharing focuses on the noncollusive
incentives of rms to engage in information sharing. It analyzes the com-
petition and, in part, the welfare eects of market information systems (see
Li 1985 and Yin 1998 for further references). Nevertheless, the literature is
not applicable because it always presumes that once all rms have decided
to participate in a market information system, the information revealed at a
later stage is truthful. This cannot be presumed with subcontracting: rms
do not commit to a mechanism, e.g. a federation, which can verify the re-
vealed information. Instead, one rm sets a subcontracting price at which is
is willing to sell a product to the rival rm, but this price does not have to
truthfully reflect the underlying cost or demand information. It can be used
to influence the rival rm’s beliefs and production decisions.
The literature on market signaling takes into account the strategic eects
which arise in settings of asymmetric information (Mas-Colell, Whinston and
Green, 1995). After Spence’s seminal contribution of education as a signal, a
wide range of applications followed, such as the classical articles on screening
and signaling in insurance (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976), entry-deterrence
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1982) and nance (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The
informed rm is often interpreted as an incumbent and the uninformed rm
as an entrant, with the entrant being uncertain about the cost of the in-
cumbent. In this chapter, the signaling model is not one of entry-deterrence
but of entry accommodation. The incumbent cannot deter entry, but only
accommodate entry, that is the incumbent can only influence the produc-
tion decision of the entrant (Chen, 1997). This is also a feature of the flat
glass market. The informed rm can be viewed as facing dierent degrees
of capacity utilization (leading to dierent opportunity costs), which are un-
observable to the other rm. A dierent interpretation could emphasize the
introduction of an innovation.
The basic articles in subcontracting have always assumed complete infor-
9mation (Kamien, Li and Samet, 1989, and Spiegel, 1993). Only recently has
incomplete information been introduced to models of subcontracting. These
are models of vertical subcontracting, where a supplier tries to influence a
manufacturer’s beliefs about the supplier’s costs. With vertical subcontract-
ing, both rms could enter the market on their own, with outsourcing, one
rm has lost this ability of entry (Van Mieghem, 1998). This chapter will
consider a model of horizontal subcontracting, where both rms produce and
compete at the same stage of the vertical supply chain and both rms can
enter the market on their own.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section (2.2) the
signaling model is described and section (2.3) calculates the separating and
the pooling equilibria. Section (2.4) contains a welfare comparison between
the signaling model and a model with information sharing through trade
associations. Section (2.5) concludes with a discussion of the results.
2.2 The model
In a signaling model, one rm has private information about its costs. The in-
formed rm ("the incumbent") takes an action, here setting a subcontracting
price. The uninformed rm observes the action, but not the private infor-
mation. Yet the choice of the action is a signal about the informed rm’s
private information. (In a screening model the uninformed rm would take
an action).
Consider two rms, 1 and 2, which compete in one market. Firm 1 can
be of two types with high or low marginal costs C 2 (cl; ch) with ch  cl  0.
Firm 1’s type will be called ci (i = l; h): The prior probability of being a low
cost type is pl = Pr(C = cl) 2 (0; 1). Firm 1 has private information about its
costs. They can be interpreted as representing rm 1’s capacity utilization
(opportunity costs) which is not observable by rm 2. In the model the
private information concerns costs and not demand. Demand uncertainty
is sometimes a feature in signaling models, but then it is less plausible to
assume asymmetric information. Firm 2 does not know rm 1’s type. The
prior probability of rm 1 being a low-cost type, pl, is common knowledge.
It holds that ph = 1 − pl. Firm 2’s constant marginal cost, c2, is common
knowledge and normalized to c2 = 1. There are no xed costs of production.
Both rms can produce the homogeneous product x. Firm 1 is willing to
subcontract (sell) the amount s of product x to rm 2. The inverse demand
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function is linear with P (x1; x2; s) = 2− x1 − x2 − s.
The signaling game is specied by the following sequence of rules, payo
functions and the solution concept. As to the rules of the game, nature rst
determines a cost realization for rm 1. Firm 1 has private information about
its costs.
Stage 1 : Firm 1 oers a subcontracting (transfer) unit price t, at which
it is willing to sell product x to rm 2.
Stage 2 : Firms compete in (Cournot) quantities. Firm 1 decides on its
sale x1. Firm 2 simultaneously decides how much of its sale it wants to
subcontract (buy) from rm 1, s(t), and how much of its sale it wants to
produce on its own, x2(t).
Formally, rm 1’s type is ci, i = l; h. Firm 1’s action space in stage 1 is T
= ft jt  0g and in stage 2 it is X1 = fx1 jx1  0g. A strategy of rm 1, and
I will only consider pure strategies, is a mapping from its type space to the
Cartesian product of its action spaces, i.e. from fcl; chg to T  X1. Firm 2
cannot observe rm 1’s type. However, it observes rm 1’s action, the price
oer t of stage 1, before deciding on her own action in stage 2. Firm 2’s
action space in stage 2 is SX2 = f(s(t); x2(t)) js(t); x2(t)  0g. A strategy
of rm 2 is a mapping from T to S X2.
Firms’ payo functions are the expected prots.
The solution concept is that of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). It
deals with the issues of updating and perfection in such a way that strategies
and beliefs are mutually consistent in equilibrium.
In games of incomplete information, the concept of subgame perfection
is extended by the idea of Bayesian updating in the following way. In the
above game for example, at stage 2, rm 2 doesn’t know rm 1’s private
information (rm 1’s costs), so stage 2 is not a proper subgame. (Technically,
the information set is not a singleton. The only subgame is the entire game.)
But rm 2 observes rm 1’s action before choosing her own action. Now in
a Bayesian equilibrium rm 1’s action can depend on its type. Therefore,
rm 2 can observe rm 1’s action (the subcontracting price) and update her
beliefs about rm 1’s type (low- or high-cost) before choosing her own action.
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a set of strategies and beliefs such
that at any stage of the game, strategies are optimal given the beliefs, and the
beliefs are obtained from equilibrium strategies and observed actions using
Bayes’ rule (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1992).
Updating is not possible if an action of rm 1 is not part of an optimal
strategy and therefore a probability-0 event. Bayes’ rule cannot be applied
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to determine the posterior beliefs of rm 2 and any posterior beliefs are
possible. This is the reason why a PBE doesn’t restrict out-of-equilibrium
beliefs and why there might be many equilibria. The renements of Pareto
dominance and the "intuitive criterion", which puts restrictions on the out-
of-equilibrium beliefs, will be applied to determine a unique separating equi-
librium (Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995 and Wolfstetter, 1998). This
will be the equilibrium with the highest prot for the informed rm.
2.3 Signaling equilibria
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium cannot be determined by backward induction
when there is incomplete information. Strategies are optimal given the beliefs
and the beliefs are consistent with these optimal strategies. The argument is
circular, so the equilibrium will be solved in two steps. First, for given beliefs
the equilibrium strategies will be determined. Secondly, for these then given
equilibrium strategies it will be checked which beliefs, and if in particular the
beliefs used in the rst step, are consistent with the equilibrium strategies.
In equilibrium, beliefs and strategies have to be mutually consistent.
In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium two types of equilibria might arise. In a
separating equilibrium the two types of rm 1 choose dierent actions, i.e., a
low-cost type chooses a subcontracting price tl and a high-cost rm chooses
th, with tl 6= th (th might be a prohibitive price). In a pooling equilibrium the
two types of rm 1 choose the same action, i.e. both types choose the same
subcontracting price tl = th. Firm 2 cannot infer information from observing
the action to update its beliefs about rm 1’s type.
2.3.1 Equilibrium strategies for given beliefs
At stage 2, rms’ equilibrium strategies depend on the beliefs of rm 2 about
rm 1’s type. Firm 2’s beliefs are a posterior distribution i(t) = (ci jt)
over rm 1’s types (i = l; h). The belief functions l(t) and h(t) = 1−l(t)
denote the probability, with which rm 2 expects rm 1 to be a low-cost,
respectively a high-cost type. These are the beliefs which will be assumed to
be given. They will be discussed in more detail later.
At stage 2, rm 2 maximizes its expected prot after observing the sub-
contracting price t
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max
s;x2
E2(t) = (2− xe1 − x2 − s)(x2 + s)− c2 x2 − ts (2.1)
with xe1 being rm 1’s expected sale. The beliefs are important for deter-
mining xe1. It holds that x
e
1(t) = l(t) x1(cl; t) + h(t) x1(ch; t) with x1(ci; t)
denoting rm 1’s sale when rm 1’s type is ci, i = l; h (In the linear case this
is equivalent to xe1(t) = x1(c
e; t) with ce = l(t)cl + h(t) ch).
Firm 2’s total sale on the market, X2 = s+x2, is the sum of the quantity
subcontracted (bought) from rm 1, s, and the quantity produced by rm
2 on its own, x2. The marginal costs determine how much to subcontract
(buy) and how much to produce. If the subcontracting price t is (weakly)
less than the marginal cost c2 (c2 = 1), then rm 2 will subcontract all of its
sale, otherwise, if t > 1, rm 2 will produce all of its sale on its own. In all
of the following piecewise dened functions it is useful to keep in mind, that
only for t  1 subcontracting will actually occur.
Formally, derivation of rm 2’s prot in equation (2.1) yields that
d
ds
>
(<)
d
dx2
if t <
(>)
1
So either rm 2 subcontracts or produces all of its sale. Firm 2’s reaction
functions are
(s(t); x2(t)) =
(
(
2−t−xe1
2
; 0) if t  1
(0;
1−xe1
2
) if t > 1
At stage 2, rm 1 maximizes its expected prot, depending on its type
ci; i = l; h and the subcontracting price t
max
x1(ci;t)
1(ci; t) = (2− x1 − xe2 − se)x1 − cix1 + (t− ci)se (2.2)
Note that the expected prot of rm 2 refers to the random variable ci
while the prot of rm 1 refers to xe2 and s
e as rm 1 knows its cost ci with
certainty. Then rm 1’s reaction function is
x1(ci; t) =
(
2−ci−se
2
if t  1
2−ci−xe2
2
if t > 1
In equilibrium, the expected output is equal to the actual output, that is
xe1(ci; t) = x1(ci; t), x
e
2(t) = x2(t) and s
e(t) = s(t) for i = l; h. Solving yields
the equilibrium quantities.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium sales at stage 2 are
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x1(ci; t) =
(
4−ce−3ci+2t
6
if t  1
6−ce−3ci
6
if t > 1
(2.3)
(s(t); x2(t)) =
(
(2+c
e−2t
3
; 0) if t  1
(0; c
e
3
) if t > 1
(2.4)
Proof. See above.
Note that the employed beliefs of rm 2 about rm 1’s type have upto
now only been specied as general belief functions l(t) and h(t). They
determine expected sales and costs, e.g. ce = l(t)cl + h(t) ch.
The subcontracting price t influences the optimal quantities through a
subcontracting and an expectation eect. If the subcontracting price t in-
creases up to t = 1, rm 2’s marginal costs increase and the optimal quantity
s(t) decreases. Firm 1’s optimal output x1(ci; t) increases. If the expectation
about rm 1’s cost ce(t) decreases then rm 1 increases and rm 2 decreases
its optimal output, because rm 1 is expected to follow a more aggressive
strategy.
At stage 1, rm 1 maximizes its expected prot
max
t
E1(ci; t; c
e(t)) = (2− x1 − xe2 − se)x1 − cix1 + (t− ci)se (2.5)
The terminology will be as follows. The rst term, ci, is rm 1’s true type,
the second term is the subcontracting price t and the third term ce(t) is rm
2’s expectation about rm 1’s type (e.g., in a separating equilibrium beliefs
will be such that the expected type will always be rm 1’s true type, that
is ce(t) = ci). Inserting the equilibrium sales of stage 2 given in proposition
(1) into the prot function in equation (2.5) leads to the reduced form prot
function.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium prots at stage 1 are
E1(ci; t; c
e(t)) =
8<:
16−8ce+(ce)2−48ci−6ceci+9c2i+40t+8cet+12cit−20t2
36
if t  1
(6−ce−3ci)2
36
if t > 1
(2.6)
Proof. See above.
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Firm 1 now decides on a subcontracting price t. In equilibrium two self-
selection conditions have to be met. The low-cost and the high-cost type
rm choose actions tl and th which lead to the highest expected prots.
The conditions become intuitively clear when explained in the context of the
separating or pooling equilibrium. For completeness they will be stated in
their general form here as well
1(ch; th; c
e(th))  1(ch; t; ce(t)) (2.7)
1(cl; tl; c
e(tl))  1(cl; t; ce(t)) (2.8)
for all t: In a separating equilibrium the actions tl and th will be dierent,
in a pooling equilibrium, if one exists, they will coincide.
2.3.2 Equilibrium beliefs for given strategies
In a PBE beliefs have to be consistent with the equilibrium strategies. Two
types of equilibria, each with dierent equilibrium strategies, are possible.
In a separating equilibrium, each type chooses a dierent action. A low-
cost type chooses a subcontracting price tl and a high-cost rm chooses th
with tl 6= th. In equilibrium the choice of t is a perfect signal about the
private information of rm 1. The beliefs will typically be altered radically
after observing t. The belief function l(t) determines how the a priori belief
pl, that rm 1 is a low-cost type, is updated after observing t to the posteriori
belief l(t) that rm 1 is a low-cost type. In a separating equilibrium, beliefs
are such that
l(tl) = 1
l(th) = 0
respectively ce(tl) = l(tl)cl + h(tl)ch = cl and c
e(th) = ch. An oer t is
a perfect signal. After observing the oer, rm 2 knows rm 1’s type with
certainty.
In a pooling equilibrium the two types of rm 1 choose the same action
(tl = th), so the equilibrium strategies are very dierent from those of a
separating equilibrium. The belief functions are dierent as well
l(tl) = l(th) = pl
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respectively ce(tl) = c
e(th) = c
e with ce = plcl + phch. Observing price t
doesn’t change the a priori beliefs.
For both equilibria, observing an action o the equilibrium path is an
event with probability zero. Updating is not possible and there are no re-
strictions on the belief functions. Any out-of-equilibrium beliefs are possible.
2.3.3 Separating equilibria
The above results will simplify the calculation of a separating equilibrium.
The two self-selection conditions of equation (2.7) and (2.8) will be crucial.
They ensure that the signal is credible. No rm has an incentive to mis-
represent its type. In a separating equilibrium the self-selection equilibrium
conditions are
1(ch; th; ch)  1(ch; t; cl) (2.9)
1(cl; tl; cl)  1(cl; t; ch) (2.10)
for all t.
The interpretation is as follows. Equation (2.9) states that a high-cost
rm has no incentive to mimick a low-cost rm. In prot 1(ch; th; ch), rm
1’s true type is ch, the oered subcontracting price is th and rm 2’s beliefs
about rm 1’s type have been updated to the true type, ch. In the deviation
prot 1(ch; t; cl), rm 1 has high-costs ch, it could nevertheless signal low-
cost via t and mislead rm 2 to believe that it has low-costs cl. The equation
states that signaling the true type is more protable than misrepresenting
the type. This can be explained as follows. A high-cost rm 1 would want
to mislead the uninformed rm 2 and mimick a low-cost rm’s type. If a
high-cost rm 1 could successfully signal low-costs, rm 2 would produce
less and rm 1’s prot would increase. On the other hand, the high-cost
rm 1 would have to subcontract (sell) the product possibly below its own
marginal costs. So a high-cost rm 1 cannot mimick every low-cost rm’s
price. In a separating equilibrium, rm 1 will never mislead rm 2, rm 1
will always signal its true type.
Equation (2.10) states in a similar way that the low-cost type has no
incentive to signal being a high-cost type.
The two self-selection conditions hold if it is more expensive for a high-
cost type to signal low costs than it is for a low-cost type. This assumption is
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known as the single-crossing property (Kreps, 1990). In the subcontracting
model it almost always holds that signaling is cheaper for the low-cost type,
so that he can successfully distinguish himself from the high-cost type.
Solving both equations and applying the renement of Pareto dominance
yields the unique separating equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Unique separating equilibrium). The following beliefs and
strategies are a separating equilibrium. It is the unique separating equilibrium
with respect to Pareto dominance.
l(t) =
(
1 if t  t
0 if t > t
(equilibrium beliefs)
(tl ; t

h) =
8>><>>>:
(tmax 2;−) if region Ib
(1;−) if region IIa
(1;−) if region IIb
no offer if otherwise
(equilibrium prices)
with t = tl and with terminology t

h = " − " if th > 1 (i.e. any price at
which no subcontracting occurs). The value tmax 2, which is less than 1, and
the regions are dened in equations (A.9) and (A.15) in appendix (A.1). The
regions are illustrated in gure (2.1). Firms’ equilibrium sales are determined
according to proposition (1).
Proof. The proof of being a separating equilibrium consists of two parts.
First, take the beliefs as given. Then for every type, deviation from the equi-
librium strategies is not protable, i.e. the self-selection conditions 1(ci; t

i ; ci) 
1(ci; t; c
e(t)) (i = l; h) have to hold for all t. The subcontracting price ti
is rm 1’s best reply to rm 2’s sales decisions, since rm 1 cannot increase
its payo by choosing any other t. Neither a low-cost nor a high-cost type
rm 1 can increase its prot by misleading rm 2 about rm 1’s true type.
Similarly, rm 2’s equilibrium sales are best replies to rm 1’s equilibrium
strategies. In the proof it is crucial to check in the belief function whether a
deviation of t changes the beliefs employed in the deviation prot (t < t) and
whether rm 2 stops subcontracting (t > 1). Secondly, take the equilibrium
strategies as given. Then the beliefs have to be self-fullling.
The proof of uniqueness of the separating equilibrium requires apply-
ing the renement of the "intuitive criterion". For details of the proof see
appendix (A.1).
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Remark 1 In region Ib, the separating equilibrium subcontracting price t =
tl = tmax 2 is less than 1 (which is the full information subcontracting price),
see tmax 2 < 1 according to equation (A.13). In region IIb, the separating
equilibrium subcontracting price t is below production costs (t = 1 < cl).
Summarizing gives the important result for the low-cost rms separat-
ing equilibrium subcontracting price t = tl in gure (2.1). This gure is
the core of this chapter. It not only shows the equilibrium price t for the
unique separating equilibrium for each cost realization, it also contains all
the necessary information for welfare comparisons.
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Figure 2.1: Separating equilibrium subcontracting price t
Figure (2.1) shows the optimal subcontracting price t for every possible
cost realization of cl and ch. The dierent regions have dierent interpreta-
tions.
In region Ia, a separating equilibrium does not exist. The low-cost as well
as the high-cost type rm 1 have production costs which are less than the
production costs of rm 2 (cl; ch < c2 = 1). The advantage of misleading
beliefs is outweighed by the possibility of selling at a high subcontracting
price of 1. A low-cost rm would have to set a very low price tl if it wants to
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prevent a high-cost rm from mimicking. But at such a low price tl, the low-
cost rm would instead prefer to subcontract (sell) at the highest price tl = 1,
making unit prots of 1− cl, even if this would mislead rm 2 to believe that
it is buying from a high-cost rm. (Technically, the equilibrium price tl is an
element of an empty interval, see equation (A.13) and the remarks concerning
existence). Instead, proposition (4) will show that pooling equilibria exist
with both rms choosing t = 1.
Region Ib is the most interesting case. The low-cost rm charges a price
less than 1, t = tl = tmax 2 < 1, and the high-cost rm charges th = 1. It
is the classical case where the low-cost rm can successfully signal its type
and where a low price t is determined by the constraint of preventing a
high-cost rm from mimicking the low-cost rm. In region Ib, a high-cost
rm would make losses ch − 1 per unit from subcontracting, which it would
have to recover from the benets of manipulating beliefs. Misleading beliefs
is so protable that the low-cost rm has to choose a low subcontracting
price t < 1 in order to increase the losses for the high-cost rm and make
mimicking unprotable. An increase in high-costs ch (and thereby higher
losses of a high-cost rm) allows c.p. the low-cost rm to increase its price t
as well. Only at and above the border between region Ib and II would losses
of a high-cost rm be so high that a low-cost rm could charge the highest
price at which subcontracting still occurs (t = 1). The interesting feature is
that the signaling costs in region Ib have to be borne by the informed rm
1, not the consumers. This is explained in more detail in the next section
comparing welfare.
In region IIa and IIb the low-cost rm charges t = 1 and the high-cost
rm charges any price th > 1. It does not matter which price t

h is actually
chosen, because subcontracting would never occur at any price above 1. This
is indicated by the notation th = " − " if th > 1. Region IIb is of special
interest because here a low-cost rm would subcontract (sell) at a price below
its production cost (t = 1 < cl) but revealing its true type outweighs these
losses, see remark 1.
In region III even this is no longer the case. Both types of rms would
incur substantial losses from selling below production costs (cl; ch > ti = 1)
and a separating equilibrium does not exist.
2.3.4 Pooling equilibria
In a pooling equilibrium the self-selection equilibrium conditions are
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1(ch; t
; ce(t)  1(ch; t; ch) (2.11)
1(cl; ; t
; ce(t))  1(cl; t; ch) (2.12)
for all t and with tl = th = t
and ce(t) = l(t
)cl + h(t
)ch = plcl + phch.
Solving yields the pooling equilibria.
Proposition 4 (Pooling equilibria) The following beliefs and strategies are
the perfect Bayesian pooling equilibria in which subcontracting occurs:
l(t) =
(
pl if t = t

0 if t 6= t (equilibrium beliefs)
tl = t

h = t
 =
(
1 if region Ipooling
no offer if otherwise
(equilibrium prices)
with pl 2 (0; 1) and region Ipooling as dened in equation (A.20) in appendix
(A.2).
Proof. In equilibrium, beliefs and strategies have to be mutually optimal.
Similar to the proof of the separating equilibrium the proof consists of two
parts. First, take the beliefs as given and show that deviation from the equi-
librium strategies is not protable. Secondly, take the equilibrium strategies
as given. Then the beliefs have to be self-fullling. Note that subcontracting
can only occur at a pooling price t  1, otherwise rm 2 would prefer to
produce on its own. Pooling equilibria at higher prices never lead to subcon-
tracting. For details of the proof see appendix (A.2).
Pooling equilibria exist in region Ipooling. This region is a subset of region
I in gure (2.1), depending on the prior probability pl. With decreasing prior
probability pl the upper boundaries of region I move inward while the lower
boundary doesn’t change. For example, if pl = 1, then region Ipooling is iden-
tical to region I of the separating equilibrium as dened in equation (A.15)
and illustrated in gure (2.1). If pl =
1
2
the pooling equilibrium conditions
(A.20) turn to cl  ch  113 cl and ch < − 439(5cl4 −2(3+
q
9− 15cl
4
+ c2l )). This
is equivalent to region I in gure (2.1) with both upper boundaries shifted
downwards. If pl = 0 the upper boundaries are ch  1 and ch < 3cl (instead
of ch < 5cl in a separating equilibrium). Then region Ipooling is a subset
merely of region Ia, with the upper boundary shifted downward.
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Separating as well as pooling equilibria exist in the overlapping regions
of region Ib (separating equilibrium) and region Ipooling (pooling equilibria).
This depends on the prior probability pl. In the border case of pl = 0 the
regions do not overlap at all. But in all other cases there are at least some
overlapping cost regions where separating as well as pooling equilibria exist.
It is not possible to "choose" an equilibrium, as they are determined by their
belief system. But again the renement of the "intuitive criterion" might
eliminate belief systems of the pooling equilibria, at least for a range of prior
probabilities pl. The "intuitive criterion" can be outlined as checking the
following. Assume a pooling equilibrium where rm 1 chooses an out-of-
equilibrium price t 6= t in order to convince rm 2 that it is a low-cost rm.
Then such a deviation should only be protable for a low-cost rm and not
for a high-cost rm. Technically, the "intuitive criterion" can be applied if
there exist a t such that
1(ch; 1; c
e(1)  1(ch; t; cl) (2.13)
1(cl; 1; c
e(1)) < 1(cl; t; cl) (2.14)
which might hold for a range of prior probabilities pl. If the conditions hold,
a deviation is only protable for a low-cost rm and the beliefs should accord-
ingly assume a low-cost rm with certainty. This is not the case in a pooling
equilibrium and therefore these beliefs and equilibria can be eliminated. (In
the other range of prior probabilities applying the "intuitive criterion" would
be inconclusive).
In order to check whether there exists a range of prior probabilities pl
which fulll both equations it is necessary to choose particular values for cl
and ch from the overlapping regions. Calculations for dierent values show
that there exist prior probabilities for which both equations do not hold. The
"intuitive criterion" is not able to eliminate all pooling equilibria.
Proposition 5 (Equilibrium selection) Separating and pooling equilibria ex-
ist in the overlapping regions of Ib and Ipooling.
Proof. See above.
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2.4 Welfare comparison with information shar-
ing equilibria
Information sharing agreements between competitors are a means to reach
complete information.
Firms have to decide whether to join a trade association (market informa-
tion system) before they know e.g. their cost realization. Then rms get to
know their costs. If they committed to an information sharing agreement the
private information is revealed to all rms via the trade association, even if
ex post revelation is harmful for a rm. The trade association can verify the
private information, e.g. by checking the accounting. Finally, rms compete
in the market. The literature focused on the question whether rms would
noncollusively commit ex-ante to share information. The results depend on
the type of competition, the degree of product heterogeneity and whether
the information shared concerns private or common values. In the standard
(Cournot) quantity homogeneous goods model, rms would noncollusively
share private cost information. Welfare increases but unfortunately con-
sumer surplus decreases. This might be the reason why antitrust authorities
tend to forbid information sharing agreements.
It is interesting to compare this reference case of complete information
with the case of incomplete information with a signaling equilibrium. With
complete information, subcontracting occurs at the highest possible subcon-
tracting price t = 1 as long as t is below the rms own production costs
(cl; ch < 1). This is the case in region Ia where both rms subcontract at
t = 1. In region Ib and IIa only a low-cost rm subcontracts at t = 1. In
a separating equilibrium a low-cost rm 1 can often only charge a price less
than 1 (see region Ib in gure (2.1). The dierence is the signaling cost of
a low-cost rm 1, which wants to distinguish itself from a high-cost rm.
Signaling costs are the dierence 1 − t. They have to be borne by the un-
informed rm. Consumers benet because rm 2 can subcontract (buy) at
lower marginal costs and therefore market Cournet quantity increases.
Proposition 6 The optimal subcontracting price t in a separating equilib-
rium is lower (equal) to the price charged under complete information, see
region Ib (region IIa) in gure (2.1) and can be lower than the sellers own
production costs (region IIb). These signaling costs have to be borne by the
informed rm and benet consumers through higher market output. Signal-
ing through subcontracting increases consumer surplus and is in this respect
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superior to an information sharing agreement.
2.5 Conclusion
Subcontracting was shown to be a way to signal private information. But the
concern, that the nature of competition reduces welfare and consumer sur-
plus, is unwarranted. Instead, for some regions of cost realizations, consumers
strictly benet from signaling through subcontracting when compared to a
situation with complete information. The signaling costs of the informed rm
are equivalent to lower prices for consumers and consumer surplus increases.
In this respect, signaling through horizontal subcontracting is superior to an
information sharing agreement. Competition policy should, as far as infor-
mational aspects are concerned, allow subcontracting.
Chapter 3
Product variety, capacity and
subcontracting in monopoly
3.1 Introduction
Horizontal subcontracting agreements are common in many industries. Firms
subcontract production to or from a rival rm even though each rm could
produce dierent products or increase capacity on its own. Anti-trust au-
thorities have always been attentive to these agreements. While they may
lead to more production eciency they might also facilitate collusion.
The European Commission alleges that subcontracting agreements be-
tween competitors lead to a division of markets and collusive behaviour. In
a decision regarding the European flat glas industry it forbid cross-supplies
between Italien glass producers. The European court reversed the Commis-
sions decision because the Commission had failed to prove the existence of
an institutionalized system for glass exchange (European Commission, 1988,
European Court, 1992). So the question remains unresolved. Instead, com-
panies have grown more hesitant to openly engage in subcontracting agree-
ments. In the United States, the Department of Justice in its rst report to
the Senate on the National Cooperative Research and Production Act hoped
that by the time of the next triennial report the (led) joint production ven-
tures will be in actual operation so that their impact on competitiveness can
be assessed (Department of Justice, 1996).
This chapter analyzes how subcontracting agreements between competi-
tors influence competition and welfare when rms face lumpy investments.
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In particular, when do rms have a noncollusive interest to subcontract and
would consumers benet from this practice as well?
The model considers an industry with capital-intensive production in
plants of a given size with high xed costs. Due to lumpy investments rms
will at dierent demand levels typically be either capacity constrained or
have excess capacity. This is characteristic of the flat glass industry, but it
also applies e.g. to the aluminium, steel and chemical industry.
In a duopoly rms decide on product variety and capacity, that is the
number of dierent products and the number of plants. Each rm can pro-
duce either one or two dierent products in one or two plants. Changing
the product line in a plant or building a new plant incurs dierent kinds of
xed costs. In the rst stage rms choose a product-plant mix. They then
engage in a subcontracting stage and a (Cournot) quantity-setting stage.
If rms subcontract, one rm sets a price at which the rival rm in the
quantity-setting stage can buy (instead of having to produce) some or all of
this products output.
Firms’ optimal product and capacity decisions vary with the level of de-
mand. Firms start out producing one product in one plant. They have the
possibility to sell a second product and to increase capacity. Adjustments in
product variety and capacity occur at dierent levels of demand. The cases
with and without subcontracting will be compared under welfare aspects.
Subcontracting presents a trade-o between eciency gains and collusive
eects. Firms can increase production eciency by saving xed costs when
choosing a dierent product-plant combination. This change of the cost
structure aects competition and output in three dierent ways. These shall
be called the specialization, the capacity and the subcontracting eect.
Specialization of rms occurs when one rm stops producing one prod-
uct on its own, e.g. to save xed costs of switching the product line, and
does not or only partially subcontract the product instead. Firms would
thereby concentrate on dierent markets. One rm will always benet, at
the extreme it will gain a monopoly for one product, and the other rm and
consumers will always be worse o. This is the anti-trust concern about a
collusive division of markets. The capacity eect occurs when the change of
the product-plant combinations lifts capacity constraints in the production of
one or both products. It is always benecial for both rms and for consumers.
In the subcontracting literature capacities and non-convexities of costs have
not been considered - even though these are common features in many indus-
tries. The subcontracting eect influences industry output and prices via the
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subcontracting price and the subcontracted quantity, with which the buying
rm competes directly against the selling rm. The selling rm is always
worse o, the buying rm and consumers benet. The interaction of these
eects under the prevailing market characteristics, in particular the demand
level and the degree of excess capacity, determine the welfare implications.
The results are ambiguous. If subcontracting is not allowed both rms
change product variety and capacities at the same demand levels. There are
big fluctuations in the market, rms switch from having binding capacity
constraints to large excess capacities. Specialization in products and plants
would often be Pareto dominant for rms and consumers but cannot be at-
tained as noncooperative Nash-equilibria. This changes with subcontracting.
Specialized product-plant combinations can also be equilibria. One rm can
compensate the other rm through the price and quantity of the subcon-
tracted product for not producing another product or building a new plant.
But at the same time the subcontracting mechanism changes the equilibrium
output and price and reduces the incentive for the subcontracting (selling)
rm to participate. The reason is that the capacity eect only dominates the
subcontracting eect at high demand levels. Yet at these high demand levels
consumers would be better o without subcontracting. With subcontracting
either only rms or only consumers are better o, but never both.
Welfare is almost always higher at (low) demand levels, where rms lack
the incentive to noncollusively engage in subcontracting. Here it would make
sense for anti-trust authorities to supervise and enforce specialisation (and
rationalization) "cartels" instead of hoping for subcontracting as a market
mechanism. It is a dierent question if the potential gains justify the negative
implications which can be expected from the informational requirements and
institutional dynamics of such market interventions. Welfare is sometimes
higher at (high) demand levels where rms noncollusively subcontract. Un-
fortunately, consumers would be worse o. If consumer surplus is the main
criterion for competition policy then subcontracting should not be allowed.
While the results indicate a collusive character of subcontracting it is cru-
cial to keep in mind that the results were derived with assumptions, which
are most unfavourable to subcontracting. Most importantly, marginal costs
are identical and do not change with subcontracting (as they could with
economies of scale of learning). This eliminates the eciency gain of equal-
izing marginal costs, typically the driving force for subcontracting. Focus-
ing instead on capacity competition and non-convexities of costs as in this
chapter, reverses the welfare eects for consumers. Furthermore, assuming
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complementary instead of independend products on the demand side would
increase the incentive for rms to increase product variety and output and
enhance subcontracting as well.
Related literature in subcontracting includes Kamien, Li and Samet (1989)
and Spiegel (1993). Kamien, Li and Samet (1989) study how the possibility
of subcontracting production influences competition of two rival rms for
a contract or a market in an auction. The rm with the lowest bid wins
a contract and can subcontract production to the loser. Firms behaviour
changes even if they do not engage in subcontracting, and if they do, rms
bid less aggressively if the loser sets the subcontracting terms. In contrast,
Spiegel (1993) allows for the possibility of each rm accessing the product
market on its own. Then horizontal subcontracting between rival rms can
allocate production more eciently between them and for a wide range of pa-
rameters enhance industry output and welfare. In both articles, asymmetric
convex costs are the crucial assumption. This chapter, in contrast, considers
capacity competition and non-convexity of costs.
In the literature on production joint ventures Gale (1994) shows that if
rms choose an aggregate level of capacity and are able to utilize unused
capacity of the other rm by means of a use-or-loose provision, rms quote
socially optimal prices. This requires production to be overseen by an inde-
pendent management company. Breshnahan and Salop (1985) are an exam-
ple of a strand of literature where nancial and control arrangements between
rms determine the competitive incentives of parent and rival rms. Sub-
contracting diers from this literature on production joint ventures through
the fact that rms are independent and maintain separate production be-
fore competing directly in the nal marketplace. The literature on lumpy
investments usually looks at timing decisions of an investment.
The chapter is organized as follows. The monopoly case is introduced
in section (3.2) to illustrate the relevant eects and prepare for the duopoly
case. The basic model is described in section (3.2.1) and states the prots
for the cases of one and two plants. In the following, they will determine
the equilibrium capacity choice, that is the number of plants, of a monop-
olist for two cases. First, in section (3.2.2), capacity will be determined for
each level of a growing demand with exogenously given technology (that is
plant size K and the xed cost disadvantage of building a new plant F ).
This is also the relevant case dealt with in the duopoly. The case will fur-
ther distinguish between symmetrically and asymmatrically growth in the
two considered markets. Secondly, in section (3.2.3), monopoly equilibrium
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capacities will be determined for dierent technologies for any exogenously
given level of demand. Section (4.1) contains the duopoly case. Here, section
(4.1.1) deals with product and capacity decisions without subcontracting and
section (4.1.3) looks at product and capacity decisions with subcontracting.
Finally, welfare implications are dealt with in section (4.14). A discussion
follows in section (4.1.5).
3.2 Monopoly
The monopoly case is well-suited to illustrate the relevant eects and to
prepare for the more concise notation of the duopoly case.
Consider a monopolist with one plant in which he produces two indepen-
dent products, x and y. When will he invest in a second plant and what are
the welfare eects?
The European Commission alleges that subcontracting agreements be-
tween competitors lead to a division of markets and collusive behaviour.
This model looks at the trade-o between eciency gains and eects due to
a division of markets.
Due to technology, assume that there will only be capital-intensive pro-
duction plants of a given size with high xed costs. Typically, demand will be
such that there is either excess capacity or capacity constraints are binding.
In contrast to the literature on lumpy investment (usually considering either
the timing decision of investments or determining the capacity in a duopoly)
capacity is not necessarily fully utilized. In contrast to the literature on sub-
contracting marginal production costs are the same for both rms. Instead,
eciency gains from subcontracting derive from capacity restrictions.
3.2.1 The Model
Consider an industry with two rms, 1 and 2. Each rm can produce one
or both of the two products, x and y. The inverse demand functions for the
products are
P (x1; x2) = a1 − (x1 + x2) + c(y1 + y2)
P (y1; y2) = a2 − (y1 + y2) + c(x1 + x2)
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For c > 0(c < 0) the two products are complements (substitutes), while
for c = 0 they are independent.
Due to technology only lumpy investments in capacity are possible. A
production plant has a xed capacity K with high xed costs Fn. A rm
can not adjust its capacity incrementally. A production plant can be used to
produce either product x or product y at zero marginal cost upto capacity
and innite marginal cost thereafter. A rm can also produce both products
in one plant but then incurs additional xed costs of changing the product
line, Fw. It will be assumed that building a completely new plant will lead
to higher xed costs than changing the product line in an existing plant, so
that Fn > Fw. Thus, the cost of producing output levels x and y is
C(x; y) =
8><>:
Fn if 0 < x  K; y = 0 or 0 < y  K; x = 0
Fn + Fw if x; y > 0; x + y  K
1 otherwise
with Fn > Fw.
Firms can make their investment and production decisions either with or
without subcontracting being allowed. With subcontracting, one rm sets a
price t at which the rival rm can subcontract a quantity s (i.e. the latter
buys an amount s from the former). We will look at ex-ante subcontracting,
which means that the subcontracting stage is played before the quantity-
setting stage.
Firms play the following game:
1. Firms decide how many plants to build (1 or 2).
2. If subcontracting is allowed, rm 1 sets a price t at which it is willing
to sell the product x.
3. Firms engage in Cournot (quantitiy) competition for products x and
y. If subcontracting takes place rm 2 also decides on the subcontracted
quantity s.
The solution concept is that of a subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium. Note
that even in the subcontracting stage the solution is not cooperative. Firms
do not bargain on how to split eciency gains.
The results will crucially depend on whether there is excess capacity or
a binding capacity constraint. This is determined by the relationship of
demand (market size a1 and a2) to the technologically given plant capacity
K. Furthermore, for the decision whether to build a new plant or to possibly
produce both products in an existing plant, the dierence of xed costs F =
Fn − Fw will be important.
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The results will be derived for all possible parameters. These results
will be illustrated for two cases. In the rst case, demand levels a will vary
and the technological parameters (plant size K and xed costs parameters
Fn and Fw) will be held constant. Then, in a rst example, demand will
symmetrically increase in both markets to the same degree. In a second
example, demand will asymmetrically only increase in one market.
The investment decision and the welfare implications will rst be dis-
cussed for the monopoly and then for the duopoly.
One Plant
In the rst case the monopolist produces products x and y in one plant. The
prot function is1
xy = (a1 − x)x + (a2 − y)y − C(x; y) s:t x + y  K:
The quantities and the payo function depend on whether capacity con-
straints are binding or not.
If a1+a2
2
 K then capacity constraints are not binding and x = a1
2
and
y = a2
2
.
If K < a1+a2
2
then capacity constraints are binding and x = 1
4
(2K +a1−
a2) and y
 = 1
4
(2K − a1 + a2):
Therefore prots can be written as
xy =
(
1
8
(a1 − a2)2 + 12K (a1 + a2)− 12K2 − Fn − Fw if 0 < K < a1+a22
(a1
2
)2 + (a2
2
)2 − Fn − Fw if a1+a22  K
(3.1)
Two Plants
Now the monopolist produces product x in one plant and product y in a
second plant. The prot function is
x;y = (a1 − x)x + (a2 − y)y − C(x; y) s:t x  K; y  K
1Superscripts indicate which products are being produced, pixy, separated by a comma
if produced in two dierent plants, pix;y. So pixy;y means that the rm has two plants, in
the rst it produces products x and y, in the second plant it produces product y.
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In order to determine the payo function the cases have to be distin-
guished where none, only one or both of the two plants are capacity con-
strained.
If a1
2
 K; a2
2
 K then none of the capacity constraints are binding and
x = a1
2
and y = a2
2
.
If a2
2
 K < a1
2
then production of product x is capacity constrained and
production of product y is not. Then x = K and y = a2
2
.
If a1
2
> K; a2
2
> K production of both products is capacity constrained
and x = K and y = K.
Prots are:
x;y =
8><>:
(a1 + a2 − 2K)K − 2Fn if a12 > K; a22 > K
(a1 −K)K + (a22 )2 − 2Fn if a22  K < a12
(a1
2
)2 + (a2
2
)2 − 2Fn if a12  K; a22  K
(3.2)
Equilibrium capacities
The equilibrium capacities, that is the number of plants, choosen by the
monopolist depend on the demand parameters market sizes a1 and a2 and
the technology parameters K; Fn and Fw. To interpret the results, one set of
parameters has to be held constant. Two cases are conceivable. First, equilib-
rium capacities can be determined for varying demand and given technology,
or secondly, for varying technology at given demand levels.
The rst case will be more relevant. Typically, the technology parameters
are exogenously given and do not change over time quickly, while demand
may fluctuate or experience slow and steady growth. So in the monopoly and
the duopoly case it will be assumed that the technology parameters are given
and prots and plant investment decisions are then calculated for all possible
values of demand. This can be interpreted as looking at the dynamics of a
growing demand. Two examples will be distinguished. In the rst example,
markets will be assumed to be of equal size, a1 = a2 = a. Demand for product
x and demand for product y increase at the same rate. In the second example
demand will only increase for product x while demand for producty y will be
held constant. This allows for asymmetric market sizes.
The second case will be dealt with for the monopoly case to give a better
intuitive understanding for the relevant parameters. Equilibrium capacities
will be determined for varying technological parameters for any exogenously
given level of demand. This can be interpreted as a mature market where
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rms have to choose their capacity (number of plants) which is most prof-
itable in the case of variable technology and a given level of demand.
Both cases will the prices consumers face and conclude with the welfare
eects for consumers and society.
3.2.2 Equilibrium capacities for growing demand
The case of growing demand in markets of equal size will also be the "workhorse"
example for the duopoly and subcontracting cases.
Markets are of equal size, so that a1 = a2 = a. In what follows a will be
the variable parameter of interest. Capacity parameters are exogenously nor-
malized to K = 1; Fn = 0; 25 and Fw = 0; 05. The choices can be motivated
as follows. Economically important is the ratio of demand a to plant capacity
K. As long as demand varies, this ratio will also vary for any exogenously
given K. As to the choice of xed costs Fn for building a new plant and the
xed costs Fw for switching the product line in an existing plant, the impor-
tant parameter is the "disadvantage" of building a new plant F = Fn − Fw.
This dierence aects the critical value of demand at which investing in a
second plant or subcontracting will occur. The xed costs Fn are chosen
as to allow for positive prots. They are exactly half the size of the maxi-
mal prots of an unconstrained monopolist. The xed costs of changing the
product line Fw are substantially less than the xed costs Fn of building an
entirely new plant.
Then using equations (3.1) and (3.2) prot with one plant is
xy =
(
1
2
a2 − Fn − Fw if 0 < a  1
a− 1
2
− Fn − Fw if 1 < a (3.3)
and prot with two plants is
x;y =
(
1
2
a2 − 2Fn if 0 < a  2
2a− 2− 2Fn if 2 < a (3.4)
Comparing the two prot functions yields that the monopolist invests in
a second plant when demand is larger than a.
What determines the demand intercept a at which the monopolist switches
from producing both products in one plant to production with two plants?
In general it is protable to run two plants if the prot dierence  =
x;y − xy is positive. Using equations (3.3) and (3.4) this yields:
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Figure 3.1: Monopoly prots as a function of demand with the number of
products per plant as indicated
 =
8><>:
−F 0 < a  1
1
2
(a− 1)2 − F 1 < a  2
a− 3
2
− F 2 < a
(3.5)
The prot dierence will never be positive for 0 < a  1 because −F < 0.
For 1 < a  2, it will only be positive if a > 1 +p2F . Then switching to
two plants will only occur in this interval if F < 1
2
.
Proposition 7 A monopolist increases his capacity by a second plant if de-
mand a exceeds
a =
(
1 +
p
2F if F < 1
2
3
2
+ F if F  1
2
(3.6)
If the disadvantage in xed costs for investing in a new plant is not to high
(F < 1
2
) the monopolist will have excess capacity.
Proof. Solve equation (3.5) for a. If F < 1
2
then 1 < a  2 and the
two-plant monopolist is not capacity constrained and has excess capacity.
If the disadvantage in xed costs F is not extremely large (F < 1
2
) then
1 < a  2. This lends itself to an easy interpretation.
If demand is low relative to capacity, a  K = 1, then neither the
one-plant nor the two-plant monopolist is capacity constrained. They have
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the same prots except that the two-plant monopolist has higher total xed
costs, thus leading to a negative prot dierence, −F < 0. It will always be
better to produce in one plant. If a > 1; the one-plant monopolist is capacity
constrained. He can start charging higher prices but cannot expand output.
The two-plant monopolist can increase prices and output until he reaches the
monopoly output a = 2 beyond which he would also be capacity constrained.
For a > 2, unless the xed cost dierence F is extremely large, it will always
be more advantageous to be a constrained two-plant monopolist than being
a constrained one-plant monopolist with total capacity only half as large. So
switching from one regime to another will occur in the interval 1 < a  2.
It is another straightforward result that switching will occur later if the xed
costs for a new plant, Fn, and thereby also the xed cost disadvantage, F ,
increase.
Remark 2 The critical demand a, at which a monopolist invests in a second
plant, increases with the xed cost (disadvantage) of building a new plant.
Proof. From (3.6) it es clear that @a

@F
> 0 for all F:
Prices for the two products are identical and depend on the state of
demand, the number of plants and the number of products produced per
plant. Prices for the one-plant and the two-plant monopolist are as follows
pxy =
(
a
2
if 0 < a  1
a− 1
2
if 1 < a
px;y =
(
a
2
if 0 < a  2
a− 1 if 2 < a
At demand a prices will fall:
Social welfare would be higher if the monopolist would switch to the
second plant at a lower demand level a
0
< a. Social Welfare is the sum of
producer and consumer surpus, W =  +CS. For the consumers it would be
better to have a two-plant monopolist than a one-plant monopolist because
prices would be lower, see gure (3.2). So switching later, that is a
0
> a,
would be worse for rms and worse for consumers. Switching earlier, that is
a
0
< a, would be worse for rms but better for consumers, and in fact social
welfare would be higher.
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Figure 3.2: Monopoly prices as a function of demand a and number of prod-
ucts per plant as indicated
Consumer surplus is
CS =
xZ
0
p(x)dx− px
For the one-plant monopolist this is
CSxy = 2(

ax− 1
2
x2
 1
2
0
− (a− 1
2
)
1
2
) =
1
4
(3.7)
and for the two-plant monopolist
CSx;y = 2(

ax− 1
2
x2
 a
2
0
− (a− a
2
)
a
2
) =
1
4
a2 (3.8)
The welfare optimal demand a
0
for switching to two plants would then
be, using F < 1
2
and equations (3.5), (3.7) and (3.8):
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W = x;y + CSx;y − xy − CSxy = 1
2
(a− 1)2 − F + 1
4
(a2 − 1)
This leads to a
0
= 2
3
+ 1
3
p
1 + 12F and a
0
< a = 1+
p
2F . In the example,
welfare optimal switching would occur substantially earlier at a
0
= 1; 28
instead of a = 1; 63:
Proposition 8 Welfare optimal switching to two plants would occur earlier
and at a lower critical demand a
0
than at the demand level a at which the
monopolists switches.
Proof. For F < 1
2
it holds that a
0
< a, see above.
3.2.3 Equilibrium capacities for varying technologies
Now assume that demand is exogenously given at a1 = a2 = 1 and that the
capacity parameters plant size K and xed cost disadvantage F may vary.
Then the prot functions (3.1) and (3.2) become
xy =
(
K − 1
2
K2 − Fn − Fw if 0 < K < 1
1
2
− Fn − Fw if 1  K
and
x;y =
(
(2− 2K)K − 2Fn if 0 < K < 12
1
2
− 2Fn if 12  K
It is more protable to run two plants if  = x;y − xy is positive:
 =
8><>:
K − 3
2
K2 − F if 0 < K < 1
2
1
2
−K + 1
2
K2 − F if 1
2
 K < 1
−F if 1  K
Figure (3.3) shows in which region two plants would be more protable.
If xed costs for a new plant are very high, then rms will always only invest
in one plant.
The prices of the two products are identical because the markets are of
equal size. The price for a product depends on the plant size K, the number
of plants and the products produced in each plant.
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Figure 3.3: Optimal number of plants as a function of F and K
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Figure 3.4: Monopoly prices as a function of K with the number of products
per plant as indicated
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Figure 3.5: Optimal number of plants as a function of F and K
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Now assume that the xed cost disadvantage F is also exogenously given.
Then the monopolist will prefer one plant only if the capacity of one plant,
K, is very small or very large, see gure (3.5).
If K < K
0
, neither the one-plant nor the two-plant rm is capacity con-
strained. Running one plant is more protable because even though the
two-plant rms total capacity is twice as high there are no additional sales
to cover the additional xed costs.
If K > K
0
, the one-plant rm’s capacity constraint is getting less and
less severe. Its disadvantage of lower total output vanishes completely for
K > K
00
: The two-plant rm’s output advantage is no longer bigger than the
xed cost disadvantage.
For consumers, this leads to the result that for big plant sizes, K > K
00
,
the price would be higher than for a broad range of smaller plant sizes, a result
which is at rst counterintuitive. If plant sizes are "too" big a rm could
not cover the additional xed costs and would rather sell a lower quantity.
Firms do not take into consideration the loss of consumer surplus.
The corresponding prices are illustrated in gure (3.6).
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Figure 3.6: Monopoly prices as a function of K and products per plant as
indicated
Chapter 4
Product variety, capacity and
subcontracting in duopoly
4.1 Duopoly
4.1.1 The Model
Consider an industry with two rms, 1 and 2, which can produce one or
two products, x and y. The inverse demand functions for the products are
linear, the products are independent and the markets of the two products
are of equal size. Due to technology, only lumpy investments in capacities
are possible. A rm can not adjust its capacity incrementally. A production
plant has a xed capacity K and high xed costs Fn. A production plant can
be used to produce either product x or product y at zero marginal costs up
to capacity and innite marginal costs thereafter. A rm can also produce
both products in one plant but then the rm incurs xed costs of changing
the product line Fw. The xed cost of the rst plant will be assumed to be
sunk (see appendix B.1.3 for the technical reasons). Increasing capacity by
building a completely new (second) plant leads to higher xed costs than
changing the product line, that is Fn > Fw. Thus, the cost of producing
output levels x and y is
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C(x; y) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if 0 < x  K; y = 0 or 0 < y  K; x = 0
Fw if x; y > 0; x + y  K
Fn if x; y > 0; x + y > K; x  K
Fn + Fw if x; y > 0; x > K
1 otherwise
Due to symmetry there will often be two asymmetric equilibria. We
will without loss of generality concentrate on one of these equilibria. Firms
start out producing one product in one plant. We will assume that rm 1
produces product x and rm 2 produces product y. Firms make product
and capacity decisions either with or without subcontracting. We will only
consider ex-ante subcontracting, where the subcontracting stage precedes the
quantity-setting stage. The game with subcontracting involves three stages:
Stage 1 : Product and capacity decisions: Firms decide on the number of
products they wish to sell and the number of plants, that is whether or not
to build a second plant.
Stage 2 : Firm 1 chooses a subcontracting price t, at which rm 2 can
subcontract (buy) product x.
Stage 3 : Cournot (quantity) competition. Firms decide how much to
produce of each product and rm 2 also decides on s, the quantity of product
x it buys.
The payo functions depend on the number of products and plants and
on the corresponding capacity constraints. The solution concept it that of a
subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium.
4.1.2 Product and capacity decisions without subcon-
tracting
The two rms can choose between two strategies as to the number of products
and number of plants. But it is not necessary to look at every theoretically
possible product-plant combination. It is for example sucient for the ques-
tion of capacity expansion to reduce the two-plant cases to the combination,
where only one product is produced in each plant. Then the game without
subcontracting consists of 9 possible outcomes. Due to symmetric payos
this can be further reduced to 6 outcomes. The normal form game is shown
in the following table 4.1.2:
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Firm 2
y xy x,y
Firm 1 x (f; f)
#a1
xy (g; h) −−−!a4(=a1) (k; k)
#a2
x,y (n; o) (m; l) −!a3 (p; p)
Firm 1 can produce product x in one plant (x), both products in one
plant (xy) or both products in two dierent plants (x,y). The prots of the
rms are denoted for each possible outcome, rst for rm 1 and then for rm
2. For example, if both rms produce one product each they would have the
same monopoly prot f. If rm 1 produces both products in two dierent
plants (x,y) and rm 2 produces both products in one plant (xy) prots for
rm 1 and rm 2, (m; l), are
m = max
x1;y1
(a− x1 − x2)x1 + (a− y1 − y2)y1 − Fn s:t: x1  K; y1  K
l = max
x2;y2
(a− x1 − x2)x2 + (a− y1 − y2)y2 − Fw s:t: x2 + y2  K
Each prot function is a piecewise dened function. The function changes
continuously at each demand level at which either the own or the other rms
capacity constraint starts getting binding. The prot functions are described
in appendix B.1.1. The arrows in table 4.1.2 indicate at which critical demand
ai a rm would prefer to deviate. For example, in equilibrium (f; f) both
rms are a monopolist with one product. For demand levels a  a1, rm 1
(and rm 2) would deviate and start to produce the second product as well,
the equilibrium switches to the duopoly (k; k). The noncooperative Nash-
equilibria for dierent states of demand are shown in gure 4.1. They can be
interpreted as showing the adjustment process for a slowly growing demand.
Proposition 9 (Without Subcontracting)
(i) (Product decisions)
Both rms extend their product line at demand levels a  a1.
(ii) (Capacity decisions)
If Fw < Fn < Fw +
9
50
, both rms increase capacity at demand levels
a  a2.
If Fw +
9
50
 Fn, rm 1 increases capacity at demand levels a2  a < a3
and both rms increase capacity at demand levels a3  a.
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Figure 4.1: Prots, product and capacity decisions without subcontracting
Proof. See appendix B.1 and gure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 can be interpreted as follows. In the normal form game in
table 4.1.2, in outcome (f; f) both rms produce one product. Firm 1 would
deviate and produce both products if the additional Cournot prot on market
y covers the additional xed costs of changing the product line Fw. Prots
with deviation are higher if g > f , that is if demand a > a1 = 3
p
Fw = 0:95.
Similarly, rm 2 would deviate and produce a second product if k > h, that
is if a > a4 (= a1). So both rms choose the new strategy of producing both
products if demand a > a1. The equilibrium switches from (f; f) to (k; k).
Furthermore, both rms deviate from outcome (k; k) and increase their
capacity at demand levels a > a2 if a2 > a3. The prot of rm 1 is higher
if m > k (a > a2) and the prot of rm 2 is higher if p > l (a > a3). If
the condition a2 > a3 holds, then both rms increase capacity at the same
demand levels. Once rm 1 increases its capacity, demand is high enough
for rm 2 to increase its capacity as well. This is not necessarily the case
because rm 2’s marginal prot is dierent from rm 1’s marginal prot
when deviating as industry output in (k; k) is dierent from industry output
in (m; l). For both rms the increase in prot has to cover the additional
xed cost of building a new plant Fn − Fw. Therefore xed costs for a new
plant may not be too high relative to the xed costs of changing product
line. The condition a2 > a3 is equivalent to Fw < Fn < Fw +
9
50
. If this
condition is not met, then rm 1 and rm 2 increase capacity at dierent
states of demand. The equilibrium would rst move from (k; k) to (m; l) and
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then to (p; p):
A comparison of the outcomes in table 4.1.2 shows that there exist Pareto
dominant outcomes at which rms and consumers would be better o than
with the noncooperative Nash-equilibria. For example, rms’ total prot
in the "specialized" outcome (n; o) is always higher than in the equilibrium
outcome (k; k). For consumers the specialized outcome is always at least as
good as the equilibrium outcome. At low demand levels consumers would be
indierent, because with excess capacity in both outcomes industry output
would be the same. At higher demand levels the equilibrium outcomes get
capacity constrained rst. Industry output in the specialized (unconstrained)
outcome would be higher.
Unfortunately, the Pareto dominant outcome is no equilibrium. Without
transfer payments one rm would be better o (n > k) but the other rm
would be worse o (o < k) and would not specialize. The question is whether
subcontracting is a mechanism for rms to noncollusively turn a Pareto dom-
inant outcome into an equilibrium and whether consumers would benet as
well.
4.1.3 Product and capacity decisions with subcontract-
ing
Firms’ decisions to increase product variety or capacity change when sub-
contracting is allowed. Without subcontracting both rms increase product
variety and capacity at the same demand levels. With subcontracting rms
could share product variety or capacity during intermediate levels of demand.
Firms could save xed costs but would also change competition on the output
markets. It is not clear whether rms have a noncollusive interest to engage
in subcontracting. Therefore, the equilibria of the game with subcontracting
will be determined. The possible outcomes are the same as in table 4.1.2,
now with prots denoted with subscript s.
The payos of the outcomes with subcontracting are determined by solv-
ing the game backwards. In the third (quantity) stage rms choose optimal
quantities taking into account capacity constraints and given the product-
plant decisions and the subcontracting price t. For example, if both rms
produce both products in one plant, rms choose optimal quantities
max
x1;y1
s1(x1; y1; s; x2; y2 jt) s:t: x1 + y1 + s  K
max
x2;y2;s
s2(x1; y1; s; x2; y2 jt) s:t: x2 + y2  K
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The optimal quantities x1(t); y

1(t); x

2(t); y

2(t) and s
(t) depend on whether
capacity constraints are binding or not. They have to be calculated for each
case where either none, one or both of the rms’ plants is capacity con-
strained. The maximisation also provides the conditions, again as a function
of the subcontracting price t, determining which case applies.
Inserting the optimal quantities into the prot function leads to the re-
duced form game. In the second stage rm 1 chooses the subcontracting price
t such that rm 2’s prot with subcontracting is at least as high as without
subcontracting. If rm 2 is indierent, rm 2 will by assumption participate
in subcontracting:
max
t
s1(t) s:t: 
s
2(t)  2
The optimal price t(a) is a piecewise dened function of demand a be-
cause rm 2’s prot without subcontracting is dened dierently for dierent
demand levels. Often there are two solutions of price t for a demand region.
Only the solutions, at which the subcontracted quantity s(t) is posivite, can
be considered. In the rst stage, inserting the optimal price into the prot
function for each product-plant outcome yields the payos with subcontract-
ing. Comparing the payos leads to the Nash-equilibria.
Product decisions with subcontracting
Product decisions of rms change with subcontracting. Instead of increasing
product variety at the same demand levels rms could share product variety.
Instead of suddenly switching from outcome (f; f), where each rm sells
one product, to outcome (k; k), where each rm sells both products, rms
could share product variety in (gs; hs), see table 4.1.2. At product-plant
combination (gs; hs) rm 1 produces products x and y in one plant and rm
2 produces product y in one plant. Firm 2 subcontracts (buys) product x
from rm 1 and can thereby sell the full range of products.
Prots (gs; hs) are determined as follows. In the third stage, rm 1 and
rm 2 determine their optimal quantities for each combination of binding
and non-binding capacity constraints and the conditions determining which
of the cases applies:
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gs(x1; y1; s; y2 jt) = max
x1;y1
(a− x1 − s)x1 + ts + (a− y1 − y2)y1 − Fw
s:t: x1 + s + y1  K
hs(x1; y1; s; y2 jt) = max
s;y2
(a− x1 − s)s− ts + (a− y1 − y2)y2
s:t y2  K
(4.1)
The optimal quantities are dierent for each case where either none, one
or both rms are capacity constrained. In the second stage, after inserting
the optimal quantities into the prot function of each case, rm 1 chooses
price t:
gs(t) = max
t
(a− x1 − s)x1 + ts + (a− y1 − y2)y1 − Fw
s:t:
(
hs(t)  f if 0 < a < a1
hs(t)  k if a1  a
with hs(t) = (a− x1 − s)s − ts + (a− y1 − y2)y2
(4.2)
The optimal price t(a) is a piecewise dened function of demand a be-
cause the prot of rm 2 without subcontracting, f or k, depends on the
level of demand. Furthermore, the prot function k is also dened piecewise
depending on whether capacity constraints are binding or not. Therefore
the optimal price t(a) is dened dierently for three demand regions (see
appendix B.2 for details and the results). With the optimal price t(a) for
each level of demand it is now possible to check which capacity case applies,
that is whether none, one or both rms would be capacity constrained when
using the optimal price t(a). Inserting the optimal price t into the prot
function yields prots (gs; hs) for rm 1 and rm 2.
Firms have a noncollusive interest to share product variety if each rm’s
prot with subcontracting is higher than its prot without subcontracting.
Firm 2’s prot is at least as high as its prot without subcontracting, this
was a condition the optimal price had to meet. In fact, in equilibrium rm
2’s prot with subcontracting is always equal to its prot without subcon-
tracting. Then the task remains to check whether rm 1’s prot with subcon-
tracting is higher than rm 1’s prot without subcontracting. Unfortunately,
this only happens to be the case for demand levels, where consumer surplus
with subcontracting is lower than consumer surplus without subcontracting
(a  a1).
47
Proposition 10 (Product decisions with subcontracting)
With subcontracting there is no solution for sharing product variety where
rms noncooperatively subcontract and consumer surplus increases. For a <
a1 consumers would benet but rms are worse o, for a  a1 rms benet
but consumers are worse o.
Proof. See appendix B.2, the prot functions in gure 4.2 and consumer
surplus in gure 4.7.
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Figure 4.2: Prots, product and capacity decisions with and without sub-
contracting
Firm 2’s prot with subcontracting hs is equal to its prot without sub-
contracting, see gure 4.2. Firm 1’s prot with subcontracting gs is equal
to its prot without subcontracting for demand levels a < a1, otherwise it is
higher.
In gure 4.1, for demand levels a < a1, both rms have monopoly prots
f. They do not have an incentive to subcontract because they can not increase
their prot above the monopoly level. Firm 1 could choose a subcontracting
price such that rm 2 would be indierent. But then rm 1’s prot would be
lower than the monopoly prot and rm 1 would prefer not to subontract in
the rst place. Consumers would have beneted from subcontracting because
output would have increased. For demand levels a  a1 rms subcontract.
Firm 1 sets a price such that rm 2’s prot with subcontracting hs is equal
to its prot without subcontracting k. Firm 1’s prot with subcontracting
48
gs is higher than its prot without subcontracting k. So both rms partici-
pate in subcontracting for these demand levels. Yet consumer surplus with
subcontracting will be lower, see gure 4.7.
The results do not depend on the level of xed costs. An increase in xed
costs of changing the product line Fw decreases only rm 1’s subcontract-
ing prot. The prot function gs would shift downward and as soon as it
intersects rm 1’s prot without subcontracting, k, rm 1 would no longer
have an incentive to subcontract and the equilibrium switches from (gs; hs) to
(k; k). In the example, the dierence between gs and k starts getting smaller
for a > 1:5 because for these demand levels rms without subcontracting are
capacity constrained and rm 2 has to be guaranteed a higher prot by rm
1.
Firms’ output and industry output with subcontracting are shown in
gure 4.3 and gure 4.4.
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Figure 4.3: Firms’ output with subcontracting
There are three critical demand levels at which the optimal output and
prices clearly change . First, at a  1:5 the prot of rm 2 without subcon-
tracting increases, because rm 2 would be capacity constrained and could
raise prices and increase prots more easily. Firm 1 has to subcontract a
higher quantity s of product x to rm 2 to keep rm 2 interested in subcon-
tracting and prevent it from starting to produce product x itself. Secondly,
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Figure 4.4: Industry output with and without subcontracting
at a = 1:09 (only) rm 1 starts getting capacity constrained when subcon-
tracting. An increase in rm 1’s production of product x, x1 + s, leads to
a decrease in rm 1’s production of product y, y1. When the subcontracted
quantity s of product x increases strongly at a = 1:5, the quantity of prod-
uct x, which rm 1 sells on the market directly, x1, decreases strongly as
well. Thirdly, at a = 2:19 both subcontracting rms start getting capacity
constrained. Industry output can no longer increase.
In gure 4.4, industry output with subcontracting, Xs and Y s, is com-
pared to industry output without subcontracting, X and Y (X = Y ). Indus-
try output without subcontracting is equal to the capacity of a plant (K = 1)
for demand levels a  1:5. Industry output of product x with subcontracting,
Xs, is always less than industry output without subcontracting, X. Indus-
try output of product y with subcontracting, Y s, is sometimes lower and
sometimes higher than industry output of product y without subcontracting,
Y .
Prices are illustrated in the following gures.
Figure 4.5 shows, that the price for product x with subcontracting P sx
is always higher than the subcontracting price t. The dierence is rm 2’s
prot margin for each unit of product x which it subcontracts. Figure 4.6
shows, that prices with subcontracting, P sx and P
s
y , are always higher for
product x and sometims higher for product y when compared to the prices
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Figure 4.5: Prices with subcontracting and subcontracting price t
without subcontracting, Px and Py (Px = Py). With these results we obtain
that basically consumer surplus with subcontracting is lower than consumer
surplus without subcontracting, see gure 4.7.
The exception holds for demand levels, at which both rms would be ca-
pacity constrained either with or without subcontracting (a > 2:19). In both
cases the sum of industry output is equal to the sum of industry capacity,
which is the size of two plants. The only dierence is that with subcontracting
industry output of product x and product y would be dierent. Consumers
would prefer asymmetric outputs if total output is xed. The gain in con-
sumer surplus due to the reduction of one product’s price and the increase
of this product’s quantity outweighs the loss in consumer surplus due to the
increase of the other products price and the decrease of the other products
quantity. Firms prefer symmetric outputs if total output is xed. These are
interesting results in themselves because the products are independent. Only
the fact that total output is xed due to capacity constraints leads to these
dierent implications for consumers and rms. As a remark, this is exactly
opposite to the results when the sum of marginal costs is xed. In that case
rms prefer asymmety, because cost heterogeneity reduces competition, and
consumers prefer symmetry.
But in the case presented here, demand levels with xed industry output
will not be of further interest, because at these high demand levels rms
51
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Psx
a
P, Ps
Psy
Px , Py
Figure 4.6: Prices with and without subcontracting
would already have switched to an equilibrium where both would have in-
creased their capacity.
Capacity decisions with subcontracting
Capacity decisions of rms change with subcontracting. Instead of being
capacity constrained for a wide range of demand levels before suddenly in-
creasing capacity (leading to excess capacity), rms could share the capacity
of one additional plant through subcontracting. The equilibrium would be
(ns; os) or (ms;ls) for some demand levels instead of switching directly from
(k; k) to (p; p), see table 4.1.2. Consumers would benet if total capacity
increases through subcontracting and if this leads to higher industry output.
Of particular interest are demand levels, where both rms would be capacity
constrained without subcontracting but not yet willing to increase capacity
(demand levels 1:5 < a < a2  2 in outcome (k; k), see gure 4.1). In this
demand region, a dierent product-plant mix would be Pareto dominant for
rms and consumers. Total prots (n; o) are higher than total prots (k; k).
This does not hold for the product-plant mix (m; l), so this outcome is only
dealt with in the appendix. In outcome (n; o) industry output is higher as
well. The outcome (n; o) would be a Pareto improvement, but it is not a
Nash-equilibrium, because without subcontracting one rm would be worse
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Figure 4.7: Consumer surplus with and without subcontracting
o and deviate. Subcontracting may be a means to distribute part of to-
tal prots in such a way, that no rm would wish to deviate. The problem
is that subcontracting changes competition and total prots as well. It is
not clear to what degree prots will be reduced by the competitive eects
of subcontracting. Therefore prots and welfare for outcome (ns;os) with
subcontracting will be calculated.
Firms again noncooperatively choose quantities and the subcontracting
price. Prots (ns;os) are determined as follows. Firm 1 produces each product
x and y in one plant and rm 2 produces product y in one plant. In the third
stage optimal quantities are determined by
ns(x1; y1; s; y2 jt) = max
x1;y1
(a− x1 − s)x1 + ts + (a− y1 − y2)y1 − Fn
s:t: x1 + s  K; y1  K
os(x1; y1; s; y2 jt) = max
s;y2
(a− x1 − s)s− ts + (a− y1 − y2)y2
s:t y2  K
(4.3)
In the second stage rm 1 chooses the subcontracting price t.
53
ns(t) = max
t
(a− x1 − s)x1 + ts + (a− y1 − y2)y1 − Fw
s:t:
(
os(t)  k if a1 < a < a2
os(t)  p if a2  a
with os(t) = (a− x1 − s)s − ts + (a− y1 − y2)y2
(4.4)
Comparing prots with and without subcontracting leads to the result
that rms would only share capacities through subcontracting at high de-
mand levels, were rms would have increased capacities anyway. Consumers
would be worse o with subcontracting. At low demand levels, the Pareto
improving outcome is not a noncooperative Nash-equilibrium. This is due to
the fact that the subcontracting mechanism changes competition and lowers
total prots in such a way that rm 1 can not redistribute prot to rm 2
without being worse o itself. Firm 1 will not participate in subcontracting.
Proposition 11 (Capacity decisions with subcontracting)
With subcontracting there is no solution for sharing capacities where rms
noncooperatively subcontract and consumer surplus increases. For a1  a <
a2 consumers would benet but rms are worse o, for a  a2 rms benet
but consumers are worse o.
Proof. See appendix B.2, the prot functions in gure 4.8 and consumer
surplus in gure 4.13.
Figure 4.8 shows rms’ prots with and without subcontracting. The
comparison is of particular interest for demand levels at which non-subcontracting
rms would be capacity constrained but not yet willing to increase capacity
(1:5 < a < a2  2). Firm 2’s prot with subcontracting os is equal to its
prot without subcontracting in gure 4.1. Firm 1’s prot without subcon-
tracting ns has to be at least as high in order for rm 1 to participate in
subcontracting. This is only the case for demand levels a  a2.
Firms’ output and industry output with subcontracting are shown in
gure 4.9 and gure 4.10.
Again, there are critical demand levels at which optimal output and prices
clearly change. At demand levels a > 1:56 rm 1 starts getting capacity
constrained when subcontracting. Total quantity of product x, x1 + s; is
then xed and equal to the capacity of one plant. An increase of quantity
s subcontracted (sold) to rm 2 leads to a decrease in rm 1’s quantity x1
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Figure 4.8: Prots with and without subcontracting
sold directly on the market. At demand levels a > 2:04, in the reference
case without subcontracting, both rms would increase capacities and have
lower prots. Thus, for the case with subcontracting, rm 1 can more easily
guarantee rm 2 this lower prot. The subcontracting price t jumps to a
higher level, see gure 4.11, and the subcontracted quantity s jumps to a
lower level, see gure 4.9
Industry output with subcontracting is shown in gure 4.10. None of
the two rms is capacity constrained at demand levels 1:5 < a < 1:56.
Industry output Y s is the (unconstrained) Cournot quantity which increases
with demand. Industry output Xs is slightly lower because rm 1 internalizes
the subcontracting eect that it will have to compete directly against the
subcontracted quantity it sells to its rival. For demand levels a > 1:56 rm
1 is capacity constrained only for product x and not for product y. Industry
output of product x is equal to capacity while industry output of product y
is equal to the (unconstrained) Cournot level. In contrast, if rms do not
subcontract, industry output for each product would be equal to capacity.
The positive capacity eect for rms and consumers derives solely from the
increase in output of product y.
Prices are illustrated in the gures 4.11 and 4.6.
Figure 4.11 shows the prices with subcontracting for product x and prod-
uct y, P sx and P
s
y , and the subcontracting price t. The price for prod-
uct x starts rising strongly once rm 1 starts getting capacity constrained
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Figure 4.9: Firms’ output with subcontracting
(a > 1:56). The subcontracting price t jumps at demand a2, where non-
subcontracting rms increase capacity. The price of product y is the (uncon-
strained) Cournot price. Figure 4.6 shows the prices without subcontracting
of products x and y, Px and Py (Px = Py). The price is equal to the capacity
constrained price at demand levels a < a2, otherwise it is equal to the (un-
constrained) Cournot price. Basically, subcontracting leads to a lower (or
equal) price of product y and a higher (or equal) price of product x.
Consumer surplus with and without subcontracting is compared in gure
4.13. Consumer surplus with subcontracting is higher for demand levels a <
a2 because the capacity eect of an additional plant leads to a higher industry
output of product y. The exception is a small demand region, where the
negative subcontracting eect of product x dominates the positive capacity
eect of product y (1:5 < a < 1:56).
4.1.4 Welfare
The welfare eects of subcontracting depend on the trade-o between e-
ciency gains and potentially collusive behaviour due to the change in com-
petition. Three competitive eects influencing output shall be distinguished:
a specialization, a capacity and a subcontracting eect. Their influence on
rms and consumers when compared to the situation without subcontracting
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Figure 4.10: Industry output with subcontracting
is shown in the following table:
Firm 1 Firm 2 Consumers
Fixed costs savings (−) +
Specialization eect + − −
Capacity eect + + +
Subcontracting eect − + −
A rm can save xed costs if it engages in subcontracting instead of pro-
ducing a second product or plant. The specialization eect occurs when one
rm stops producing a product. The other rm would potentially turn into a
monopolist and consumers would be worse o. The opposite of specialization
would be an increase in product variety, that is when one rm starts pro-
ducing a second product. The capacity eect is the increase of output which
occurs when a capacity constraint of one or both products no longer holds.
The subcontracting eect reduces output and prots of the selling rm. The
buying rm is always better o because it can buy at a subcontracting price
which is below the market price. Consumers are worse o, because if both
rms would instead independently produce and sell the product, industry
output would be higher.
The welfare eects of subcontracting with product decisions are shown in
gure 4.14.
Proposition 12 (Welfare and product decisions)
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Figure 4.11: Prices with subcontracting and subcontracting price t
Welfare increases with subcontracting at demand levels a1  a < 1:3.
Proof. See above and appendix B.2.
Remark 3 The possiblity of subcontracting does not lead rms to oer the
full range of products already at lower demand levels (a < a1).
The eects of subcontracting on product decisions are relevant and shown
for demand levels where there are no capacity eects. At low demand levels
(a < a1 = 0:94), each rm could increase product variety through subcon-
tracting, but rm 1 has no incentive to participate. At higher demand levels
(a  a1), without subcontracting both rms produce both products. With
subcontracting rm 2 specializes and saves xed costs and the subcontracting
eect decreases. Firm 1 does not have higher xed costs and specialization
now outweighs the lower (negative) subcontracting eect. Consumers are
worse o because there are no capacity eects, see table above. The re-
sults might change, if the positive eect of an increase in product variety
were higher, for example if products were complements, or if capacity eects
would be relevant.
The welfare eects of subcontracting with capacity decisions are shown
in gure 4.15.
Proposition 13 (Welfare and capacity decisions)
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Figure 4.12: Prices without subcontracting
Welfare does not increase when rms subcontract (a > a2). Welfare would
be higher at demand levels 1:7 < a < a2  2, but rms do not noncollusively
subcontract.
Proof. See above and appendix B.2.
The eects are shown in the table above. The capacity eect is relevant
at demand levels, where rms are capacity constrained if they do not subcon-
tract (1:5 < a < a2  2). Then the positive capacity eect of subcontracting
would for almost all demand levels increase welfare above the welfare level
without subcontracting. But for rm 1 the capacity eect would not be
strong enough to outweigh the higher xed costs of capacity expansion and
the negative subcontracting eect. At these demand levels rm 1 would not
subcontract.
4.1.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyzed how subcontracting between rival rms influences
product and capacity competition as well as welfare when rms face lumpy
investments.
Subcontracting presents a trade-o between allocating production more
eciently by saving xed costs of increasing product variety or capacity and
potentially collusive behaviour due to specialisation, capacity and and sub-
contracting eects. If subcontracting is not allowed, specialization would of-
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Figure 4.13: Consumer surplus with and without subcontracting
ten be Pareto dominant but no Nash-equilibrium. With subcontracting they
could be equilibira. But when rms noncollusively subcontract consumers
are worse o, even if welfare rises. Either rms or consumers benet but
never both. Symmetric non-convexity of costs changes traditional results.
Subcontracting with independent products has a collusive character.
The results were derived in general, even if they were illustrated with
examples. The results crucially depend on whether rms have excess capacity
or a binding capacity constraint. This is determined by the relationship
of demand to the technologically given plant capacity. Normalizing plant
capacity to a xed value and varying the demand level produces all possible
ratios of demand to plant capacity. Furthermore, the xed costs of switching
the product line on a plant or increasing capacity by a new plant influenced
rms’ prots. Choosing values in the example influenced the absolute level
of demand at which a rm would switch from one regime to another, for
example the demand level upto which subcontracting is more protable than
not subcontracting. Choosing pathologically high xed costs would of course
change the economic interpretation, such that producing a second product
or subcontracting would never be protable. But for reasonable xed costs
the qualitative results would not change for dierent levels of xed costs.
For example, consumer surplus or the basic feature, that subcontracting is
benecial either for rms or consumers, remain the same.
The model is based on assumptions which are unfavourable for subcon-
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Figure 4.14: Welfare for product decisions with and without subcontracting
tracting. This concerns the set-up of the model and the (dis-)economies of
scope on the production and on the demand side.
In the set-up of the model with ex-ante subcontracting, rms rst subcon-
tract and then simultaneously choose all outputs in the last stage. Changing
the game would change the results. For example, with ex-post subcontract-
ing, one rm would rst have to commit to the subcontracted quantity. Simi-
larly, in Kamien, Li and Samet (1989), either the winner of loser of an auction
is a Stackelberg leader who sets the terms of the subcontract. Here, the set-
up is chosen dierently, because apart from the fact that both rms can
access the market on their own, comparing a non-subcontracting Cournot
game with a subcontracting Stackelberg game would change the results in
favour of subcontracting already due to the fact, that a Stackelberg output
is always higher than a Cournot output. Instead, we compare two Cournot
games with and without subcontracting.
The economies of scope on the production side consist of xed cost sav-
ings. Firms do not have asymmetric convex costs, the driving force for
more ecient production and benecial subcontracting in the literature. If
marginal costs would decrease, for example due to economies of scale of
learning, subcontracting would be more benecial for rms and consumers.
Finally, economies of scope on the demand side are not considered as
products are independent and benet is separable. This would not be the case
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Figure 4.15: Welfare for capacity decisions with and without subcontracting
if demand is generated by a rm which needs to combine two intermediate
inputs to a nal product or if consumers’ utility would depend on whether
products are complements or substitutes. Complementary products would
tend to enhance the welfare eects of subcontracting.
Two possible extensions seem interesting. First, complementarities on
the demand side seem to be relevant in many markets. Secondly, horizontal
subcontracting might be similar to network competition. If one thinks of a
rm as oering two products on a market, one which it sells directly and a
second product (the "last mile" in telecommunication) which it sells to a rival
rm, then regulating the price of the second product might be comparable
to regulating a subcontracting price.
The model is taylored to characteristics of the flat glass market. It ex-
plains the phenomenon that rms are least interested in subcontracting when
they start getting capacity constrained and are most interested if they would
otherwise have high excess capacities. Specialization overseen and enforced
by anti-trust authorities would at least in theory be benecial in states of
high excess capacities. Relying on a market solution such as subcontracting
would not work. Basically, subcontracting tends to have a collusive charac-
ter. In particular, if consumer surplus is the main criterion for competition
policy then subcontracting should not be allowed. If welfare is the main cri-
terion, competition policy should, for a wide range of demand levels, allow
for subcontracting.
Chapter 5
Exchange agreements between
competitors with dierent
eciency levels
5.1 Introduction
Firms within the same industry often dier with respect to their eciency
and performance and sometimes rms with dierent eciency levels enter ex-
change agreements. What are the competitive eects of exchange agreements
between competitors? How does the trade-o between potentially collusive
eects, e.g. due to a division of markets, and eciency eects look like and
how is welfare aected? What policy conclusions do the results lead to?
In an exchange agreement competitors determine an exchange ratio for
products to be exchanged. Then quantities of the products are exchanged in
this proportion without any monetary transfers.
The exchanged products can be inputs, which are then used by verti-
cally integrated companies to produce outputs. They may also be outputs,
which a company then sells under its own name, without informing the con-
sumers/rms, that it did not produce all of the ouputs itself (see gure 5.1).
There is only a small literature dealing with exchange agreements and
horizontal subcontracting. In Holt and Scheman (1988) an exchange is
a simultaneous buy/sell arrangement generally involving equal amounts of
each commodity. In the exchange agreement the ratio of physical units of
the commodities is xed. In addition Holt and Scheman require the use
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Figure 5.1: Market structure
of a monetary adjustment per unit of exchange to compensate for value
dierentials. They then look at two vertically integrated producers each
being a monopolist in the production of one input. Furthermore both inputs
are needed in xed proportions to produce a homogeneous nal product. So
each producer is forced to buy from the other producer and the exchanged
quantity determines how much of the nal product can be produced by the
company. Exchanges are then similar to vertical integration, because rms
trade the inputs at marginal costs instead of paying input-price markups.
This is reminiscent of the double marginalization problem, the successive
mark-ups (marginalization) due to vertical externalities, where rms would
be better o with vertical integration, see Tirole (1988). But as rms do not
want to produce more than the monopoly output and both rms need the
other rms input in a xed proportion the monopoly output can be sustained
through the exchange. So input exchange agreements can be anticompetitive,
when there is market power in the input market. This need not hold if each
rm could produce both products.
This chapter will allow for companies to consider producing all products
on their own and inputs do not have to be used in xed proportions. Firms
64
can produce and compete with two products and there is competition on the
output market.
In the literature on horizontal subcontracting by Kamien, Li and Samet
(1989) and Spiegel (1993) companies commit to subcontracted quantities
instead of using an exchange mechanism and a xed exchange ratio. Instead,
subcontracted quantities are bought from the competitor at a transfer price.
Other parts of the literature look at production and/or capacity sharing
arrangements between competitors which work via other forms of coordi-
nation than exchange agreements. These include production joint ventures
(mechanism: nancial and control arrangements), independent production
joint ventures (dedicated capacity), subcontracting (quantity and transfer
prices), cross-supplies (market prices and commitment to quantities) and
resalable capacity considerations.
In the international trade literature intra-industry trade in identical com-
modities may be due to having two countries being in a Cournot market each
and so having one country producing for the other country and vice versa. In
Brander (1981) each country ships the identical product to the other country
as long as the marginal transportation costs are not too high. Bernhofen and
Unteroberdoerster (1997) nd that asymmetries in cost eciency, market
size and rm concentration reduce intra-industry trade. Leahy and Mon-
tagna (1997) look at the question whether government should reduce rm
heterogeneity in an industry by helping the weaker more than the stronger
rm. Their analysis suggests favouring more ecient rms. In these papers
intra-industry trade does not refer to the case where rms exchange prod-
ucts directly before competing (this could be called inter-rm trade in an
industry).
In this chapter rms have dierent eciency levels. This could be due
to dierent reasons, e.g. because of dierent capacity constraints or costs
associated with the change of product lines. If a rm faces a capacity con-
straint (e.g. a technologically determined plant size) and faces set-up costs
for producing a second product, it could allocate the set-up costs solely to
the new product. A rm would then have to decide whether to produce
only the low-cost product and possibly enter an exchange agreement with a
competitor for the high-cost product or produce both products on its own.
In a three stage game, two rms are able to produce two products. Each
rm has a cost advantage with one of the products. If there is an exchange
agreement they rst decide on an exchange ratio. They then determine the
exchanged quantity. Each company states the quantity it wishes to exchange
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given the exchange ratio, and the lower value determines the exchanged quan-
tity. Finally, they compete in quantities.
With an exchange agreement rms can lower their costs. But rms do not
always prefer low cost structures. As a benchmark case a low cost structure
will be the case of ecient production where all products are produced with
the lowest possible production costs. Low cost structures can be achieved
through a production joint venture (PJV) in which production is overseen by
an independent management company set up by the two competing rms.
The two companies can place orders for output at marginal costs and then
compete at the marketing stage. Gale (1994) describes such an agreement
between two aluminium companies Alcan and Arco where the rolling mill is
jointly owned and operated by an independent management company. After
a purchase of Alcan had been challenged by the U.S. Department of Justice
rms accepted this consent decree. Since then the European Commission has
continued to keep a close watch on production joint ventures but started
to approve PJVs on similar terms, e.g. a PJV between chemical producers
Exxon Chemical Polymer and Shell Chimie SA for the production of linear
low-density polyethylene in France (see Milmo 1994).
Firms will always prefer exchange to no exchange while consumers are
indierent. The result depends on the fact that rms completely take into
account the strategic eect of having to compete against exchanged quan-
tities. Exchanges are welfare enhancing but do not reach the welfare level
achieved by rms with low-cost structures.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section (5.2) introduces the
model and section (5.3) compares two no exchange equilibria with dierent
cost structures. Section (5.4) solves for equilibria of an exchange agreement
followed in section (5.5) by welfare comparisons. Section (5.6) concludes with
a discussion and draws some conclusions for further research and economic
policy.
5.2 The model
Consider an industry consisting of two rms, 1 and 2, and two markets, the
market for product x and the market for product y. Each rm can produce
either one or both products but each rm has a cost advantage in one of the
product lines.
The two rms can either enter an exchange agreement or compete without
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an exchange agreement. If the rms enter an exchange agreement they play
the following three-stage duopoly game:
Stage 1: Firms agree upon an exchange ratio r = x=y.
Stage 2: Firms decide how much they would wish to exchange. The ex-
changed quantity e is determined as the minimum of the desired quantities,
e = minfry;xg:
Stage 3: Firms simultaneously and independently choose outputs. Each
rm decides how much to produce of its low cost product and, if at all, how
much to produce of its high cost product.
If rms do not enter an exchange agreement, rms only play stage 3.
The assumptions concerning the cost structure and the demand side are
as follows:
Each rm has a cost advantage in producing one of the products: rm
1 for product x and rm 2 for product y. The marginal cost of the low-
cost product is c1 and for the high-cost product c2; c2  c1. Note that the
subscripts of marginal costs only refer to the cost level and not to a rm.
Firm 1 (rm 2) can produce product x (product y) with low costs c1 (c2) and
product y with high costs c2 (c1). There are no xed costs and rms have
complete information about their rival’s costs. The cost function for rm i
for producing products x and y is
Ci(x; y) = cix + cjy i 6= j; i = 1; 2 (5.1)
Firms face the linear demand system
Px(x1;x2) = 1−X = 1− x1 − x2 (5.2)
Py(y1; y2) = 1− Y = 1− y1 − y2
with xi; yi as total sales of rm i of product x and product y. The total
quantity X is the sum of the quantities of good x the two rms sell on the
market, X = x1 + x2. The total sales of a product of a rm depend on how
much the rm produces and exchanges of this product (see gure 5.2).
More specically for product x
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Figure 5.2: Market structure with exchange agreements
X = x1 + x2 with x1 = x
0
1
x2 =
(
x2 if x2  x12
x
0
2 + x12 if x2 > x12
xi total sales of rm i; i = 1; 2
x
0
i quantity x produced by rm i
x12 quantity x produced by rm 1 and
exchanged to rm 2
Firm 1 has an advantage in producing product x and will produce all
of the amount it sells on its own, x1 = x
0
1. Firm 2 incurs high costs when
producing product x. It is interested in exchanging product x in return for
product y, that is rm 2 wants to receive quantity x12 from rm 1. The
exchanged quantities are determined on stage 2 of the game and are sunk
on stage 3 where rms choose total sales. If rm 2 wants to sell less than it
exchanged for, it doesn’t have to produce anything of product x on its own.
Instead it uses as much of the exchanged quantity it wants to sell, x2  x12.
Firm 2 will start producing product x on its own if it wants to sell more than
it exchanged for, that is x2 = x
0
2 + x12 if x2 > x12. Similar considerations
hold for rm 1:
Y = y1 + y2 with y1 = y
0
1 and y2 =
(
y2 if y2  y21
y
0
2 + y21 if y2 > y21
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Quantities with two subscripts denote exchanged quantities, with xij as
rm i exchanging product x to rm j . As rms only trade their low cost
products for high cost products there are only two possibilities for exchanged
quantities, namely x12 and y21. Firm 1 has an advantage in producing prod-
uct x. It will be interested in delivering quantity x12 to rm 2 and in getting
product y21 from rm 2 in exchange. The actually exchanged quantities are
determined by e = minfry21;x12g.
The solution concept is that of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. A
strategy for rm 1 is a decision plan s1 = fbr1; by21(r); bx1(e; r); by1(e; r)g wherebr; bx and by indicate the best exchange and output decisions conditional on
every possible exchange and output choice of rm 2. Similar considerations
hold for rm 2. Prot functions depend on exchange and quantity choices and
the strategy prole fs1; s2g = fbr1; bx1; by1; by21; br2; bx2; by2; bx12g determines the
outcomes r; xi; yi; x21; y12. Solving the prot functions with these outcomes
yield the (reduced form) payo functions.
As rms are symmetric and calculations similar for both rms, they will
only be done for rm 1 unless rm 2 has to be considered explicitly.
5.3 No exchange agreement equilibria
In order to separate eciency eects from strategic eects resulting from the
specic exchange mechanism two situations will be compared. In the rst
case there is no exchange agreement and both rms have asymmetric costs,
that is low unit costs for one product and high unit costs for the second prod-
uct. For the second case it will be assumed that both rms could produce
both products at low costs e.g. through a production joint venture (PJV)
where each rm can buy the products at marginal costs from an independent
management company1. One could also imagine that each rm trades its low
cost product in exchange for the product it would otherwise have to produce
at high costs. The low-cost structure (PJV) will be the benchmark case rep-
resenting the highest possible production eciency and social welfare. How
and if this could be achieved through an exchange mechanism will not yet
be looked at in order to exclude strategic eects of the exchange mechanism.
1In the model by Gale (1994) capacity is determined by rms’ "dedicated capacity"
and rms are, as noted in the consent decree, subject to a "use-or-lose" provision: "Each
party to the joint venture may utilize any unused portion of the other party’s capacity by
assuming the variable costs, but not the xed costs, attributable to the added production".
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The rst result is that rms will not always prefer the low-cost structure.
If the costs are suciently far apart it will be more protable for a rm to be
almost an monopolist on one market and forego prot on the second market.
The advantage of cost heterogeneity will then be higher than the eciency
gains.
5.3.1 No exchange agreement with asymmetric costs
Firms make quantity decisions. Costs are asymmetric with c2 > c1 and
without loss of generality assume c2 < 1. Total demand is X = x1 + x2; Y =
y1 + y2: The prot function of rm i is
2
ai (xi; yi) = Pxxi + Pyyi − cixi − cjyi
Solving for quantities yields
x1 =
(
1+c2−2c1
3
if c2  1+c12
1−c1
2
if c2  1+c12
(5.3)
x2 =
(
1+c1−2c2
3
if c2  1+c12
0 if c2  1+c22
and yj = xi; i 6= j; i; j = 1; 2: Figure (5.3) illustrates the duopoly and
monopoly regions for product x.
If both rms enter both markets total demand is Xa = Y a = 2−c1−c2
3
and
market price pa = 1+c1+c2
3
. Inserting the duopoly solutions gives the reduced
form payo function, the prot for rm i is
ai (c1; c2) =
(1 + c2 − 2c1)2
9
+
(1 + c1 − 2c2)2
9
: (5.4)
Within the duopoly region both rms will produce both products. Oth-
erwise at least one rm would enter only one or no market. This rm would
then have an incentive to deviate and earn a higher payo by entering the
other rm’s monopoly market. So these outcomes will be dominated by the
outcome in which both rms enter both markets. It is similar to a prison-
ner’s dilemma where both rms would be better o being a monopolist in one
2Superscripts will be a for asymmetric costs, s for symmetric costs and e for the ex-
change case.
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Figure 5.3: Firms’ quantities with no exchange agreement and asymmetric
costs
market but each rm has an incentive to deviate and enter the other rms
market. It would then not only earn its monopoly prot but in addition a
Cournot prot.
If costs are not too high both rms enter both markets and equilibrium
quantities are as in (5.3).
5.3.2 No exchange agreement with symmetric low costs:
production joint venture
Now we look at the same duopoly region with symmetric low costs, c1 = c2:
Then the equilibrium will yield that both rms enter both markets and the
solution is x1 = y1 =
1−c1
3
with Xs = Y s = 2(1−c1)
3
and market price ps =
1+2c1
3
. Prots for rm i are
si (c1; c1) =
2(1− c1)2
9
(5.5)
Proposition 14 Firms prefer competing at low costs if 1 =
1
9
(c2−c1)(2−
5c2 + 3c1) > 0: Consumers always prefer lower costs.
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Proof: Straightforward calculation and factorization of 1 = 
s
1 − a1
yield above result. Consumers are better o when both rms have symmetric
low costs for both products rather than asymmetrically low unit costs for one
product and high unit costs for the second product, because in the symmetric
case total quantity is higher, Xs > Xa; and market price is lower, ps < pa:
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Figure 5.4: Firms’ quantities with no exchange agreement and symmetric
costs
In gure 5.4 regions A and B are the feasible set of (c1; c2) combinations
in which the produced quantities are not negative: In region A 1 > 0
and rms prefer the low-cost structure, that is the welfare maximizing case
of ecient production. In region B rms are better o competing with
asymmetric costs.
This result means that rms do not always prefer to compete with sym-
metric low costs in two markets but would sometimes prefer to compete with
asymmetric costs in both markets despite the fact that the sum of unit costs
is higher. This is due to two counterveiling eects. There is a trade-o be-
tween more eciency due to lower costs and more specialization and market
power due to focusing on one market and cost heterogeneity. The eciency
eect makes rms want to have as low costs as possible. On the other hand
rms prefer to be dierent in costs and thereby increase specialization and
market power in one market.
The two eects are illustrated in an example.
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Figure 5.5: Firms’ prots for symmetric and asymmetric costs
Assume c1 = 0; c2 > c1: Then with an increase in c2 and thereby an
increase in asymmetry in both markets the prot for one rm is a(0; c2):
If the sum of the unit costs were split equally prot would be s(1
2
c2;
1
2
c2):
Comparing the prots in gure 5.5 shows that asymmetry will always be
preferred to symmetry.
The prot for symmetrically low costs is s(0; 0): Now the interesting
comparison is between the ecient prot s(0; 0) and the asymmetric prot
s(0; c2), see gure 5.6. The shaded area shows where eciency gains prevail.
At the intersection c2 = 0:4 the advantage of asymmetry starts to outweight
the eciency gains. This point corresponds to the most outward c2 of region
A in gure 5.4 where c1 = 0 and c2 = 0:4. At the maximal c2 = 0:5 each rm
is a monopolist in one market.
5.4 Exchange agreement equilibria
5.4.1 Stage 3
At stage 3 the exchange ratio r = x12=y21 and the exchanged quantity e
 =
minfry21;x12g are given. The demand system is
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Figure 5.6: Firms’ ecient and asymmetric prots
Px(x1; x2) = 1− x1 − x2 (5.6)
Py(y1; y2) = 1− y1 − y2
The prot functions are
1(x1; y1 j r; e) =
(
Pxx1 − c1x1 + Pyy1 if 0  y1  er
Pxx1 − c1x1 + Pyy1 − c2(y1 − er ) if er  y1
(5.7)
2(x2; y2 j r; e) =
(
Pxx2 + Pyy2 − c1y2 if 0  x2  e
Pxx2 − c2(x2 − e) + Pyy2 − c1y2 if e  x2
(5.8)
The prot function of rm 1 has to distinguish two regions of total sales
y1. If total sales y1 are less than the exchanged quantities agreed upon,
y1  y21 = er , marginal costs are zero because the costs on stage 2 for the
exchanged quantities are sunk on stage 3. Only if rm 1 starts producing the
additional amount y1 − er does it incur high costs c2. Figure 5.7 illustrates
this shift of the reaction curve of rm 1 at point e
r
. If rm 1 has higher
total sales, y1  er , the inward reaction curve y1(y2) with marginal costs c2
is relevant. If rm 1 sells less than the exchanged quantities, y1  er ; the
outward reaction curve with zero marginal cost is relevant.
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Figure 5.7: Sales of product y
Dierentiating the prot functions (5.7) and (5.8) yields the reaction func-
tions y
0
1(y2) =
1−y2−c2
2
; y1(y2) =
1−y2
2
; y2(y1) =
1−y1−c1
2
with y
2
= r−rc2−2e
r
and
y2 =
r−2e
r
. When solving for y1 three regions have to be distinguished:
A. y1  er and y2  y2
B. y1 =
e
r
and y
2
 y2  y2
C. y1  er and y2  y2
In the cases A and B rm 1 does not produce anything of its high cost
product y on its own. Similar considerations hold for rm 2. Taking into
account these dierent regions the solution yields
(x1; x

2) =
8><>:
(1−2c1
3
; 1+c1
3
) if 1+c1
3
 e
(1−c1−e
2
; e) if 1+c1−2c2
3
 e  1+c1
3
(1+c2−2c1
3
; 1+c1−2c2
3
) if 0  e  1+c1−2c2
3
(5.9)
(y1; y

2) =
8><>:
(1+c1
3
; 1−2c1
3
)
( e
r
; r−rc1−e
2r
)
(1+c1−2c2
3
; 1+c2−2c1
3
)
if r 1+c1
3
 e
if r 1+c1−2c2
3
 e  r 1+c1
3
if 0  e  r 1+c1−2c2
3
(5.10)
5.4.2 Stage 2
On stage 2 rms decide for a given r how much they want to exchange and
the lower of the desired quantities is then choosen. For every r an optimal e
is determined.
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The solutions (5.9) and (5.10) of stage 3 distinguish 9 regions of (e,r)
combinations. This is shown in gure 5.8.
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Figure 5.8: Equilibrium product variety
In region 3 both rms produce both products. In region 5 both rms
only produce their low-cost product but sell both products. For both rms
the quantity sold of the high-cost product is exactly th quantity exchanged
for. In region 6 rm 1 produces both products and rm 2 produces only one
product. The exchange ratio r is greater than 1 and favourable for rm 2.
For 1 unit of x it only exchanges 1/r units of y. Firm 2 stops producing its
high-cost product x at a point where rm 1 still produces both products.
Similar considerations hold for region 2. for a detailled description of the
regions see the table in the appendix.
For every given r the optimal e within each region has to be determined.
Then comparing the reduced form payo function for each of these e yields the
optimal e for a given r. As boundaries are include in both of neighbouring
regions no continuity problems arise. Due to symmetry reasons r=1 will be
of special interest.
On stage 2 rm i has to decide how much quantity e it wants to exchange.
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The prot functions are similar to the ones in (5.7) and (5.8), they now also
include the cost of producing quantity e:
1(e j r) =
(
pxx1 − c1x1 + pyy1 − c1e if 0  y1  er
pxx1 − c1x1 + pyy1 − c2(y1 − er )− c1e if er  y1
(5.11)
2(e j r) =
(
pxx2 + pyy2 − c1y2 − c1 er if 0  x2  e
pxx2 − c2(x2 − e) + pyy2 − c1y2 − c1 er if e  x2
(5.12)
The reduced form payo functions depend on what region in being con-
sidered. For r=1 regions 3,5, and 7 are relevant.
In region 3 both rms produce both products. Inserting the solutions xi =
yj =
1+cj−2ci
3
with i 6= j; i; j = 1; 2 in the prot functions and dierentiating
with regard to e leads to @1
@e
= c2
r
− c1  0 and @2@e = c2 − c1r  0. Firm 1
wants to increase e as long as r  c2
c1
. The cost for producing the exchanged
quantities rc1 has to be less than the opportunity cost c2 of producing the
high cost product itself. Firm 2 wants to increase e as long as r  c1
c2
. In
region 3 the optimal e is the minimum of the desired quantities. For c1
c2 r  c2
c1
this is the upper bound of region 3, otherwise e=0.
In region 5 similar considerations hold. The solutions xi(e); yj(e) now
depend on e. Inserting the solutions into the prot functions yield the reduced
form payo functions. Dierentiation yields that @1
@e1
 0 if e1  r2+r2c1−r−rc1r2−2
and for rm 2 that @2
@e2
 0 if e2  r+rc1−r2−r2c11−2r2 . Furthermore, these e have
to be within region 5 and cornersolutions to be checked. They would depend
on r and the cost combinations (c1; c2). For r = 1 both rms would want to
reduce the exchanged quantities as much as possible, @1
@e
= @2
@e
= −1
2
e < 0 .
This leads to the lower boundary and e = 1+c1−2c2
3
:
Similarly, in region 7 both rms want to reduce the exchanged quantities
as much as possible.
Proposition 15 In equilibrium for r = 1 both rms only produce their re-
spective low-cost product, both rms sell both products and the exchanged
quantity is e = 1+c1−2c2
3
:
Proof. : See above.
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5.4.3 Stage 1
On stage 1 the considerations done at stage 2 would have to be done for every
possible r. As both rms are symmetric at the outset there is no reason
to expect them to agree on a dierent r than r=1 (as a Nash bargaining
solution). The equilibrium exchanged quantities would always be the same
because one rm, the one with the disadvantageous r, would always announce
a lower e than the other rm and thereby "veto" an unfavourable exchange
quantity.
If one of the rms nevertheless had bargaining power it could propose a
r dierent from 1. As long as the other rm would still be better o than
without an exchange agreement the second rm would agree. The possible
regions of r are outlined in the gure below. At the most outward points of
r = c1
c2
and r = c2
c1
one rm would reap all the benets from exchange. The
exchange ratio r would determine the division of prots between the rms.
c1/c2 c2/c11
e*
e
r
Figure 5.9: Equilibrium exchange quantity e
5.5 Welfare
There are three possible equilibria to compare.
The rst question is whether exchange should take place. When there
is no exchange agreement rms have asymmetric costs and in equilibrium
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prots are a1(c1; c2) =
(1+c2−2c1)2
9
+ (1+c1−2c2)
2
9
(see 5.4). With an exchange
agreement rms produce nothing of the high cost products and exchange
e = 1+c1−2c2
3
. Equilibrium prots are e1(e
) = 2−5c1−2c
2
1+c2+c1c2−c22
9
. Firms
will prefer exchange when 1 = 
e
1 − a1 = (1+c1−2c2)(c2−c1)3 > 0. This holds
for the set of all feasible cost combinations where the produced quantity is
still positive (see region A and B in gure 5.4). Consumers will be indierent
because rms exchange an amount of quantity e which is equal to the quantity
they would otherwise produce with high costs. Total quantities and market
price are the same for both situations, Xe = Xa and pe = pa:
Proposition 16 Exchange will always be better than no exchange. Firms are
better o and consumers are indierent. Welfare is higher with exchange.
Proof: See above 1 > 0 and X
e = Xa; pe = pa.
Firms reap all the gains from exchange because they exchange a quantity
which corresponds to high costs while they in fact have low production costs.
The reason why they calculate with higher costs is due to the strategic inter-
action. They know that they will eventually have to compete against their
exchanged quantity on the output market. This reduces their prot and the
opportunity cost of exchange increases.
Now another comparison is between the exchange agreement case and
production joint venture case where both rms only have low costs and
s1(c1; c1) =
2(1−c1)2
9
(see 5.5). Firms would prefer the specic exchange
agreement if 1 = 
e
1 − s1 = (1−c1)(c2−c1)9 > 0. This again will be the
case for all cost combinations. On the other hand consumers are worse o
for all cost combinations when comparing exchange to full trade because
Xs = 2(1−c1)
3
> Xe = 2−c1c2
3
and ps = 1+2c1
3
< pe = 1+c1+c2
3
. Welfare, dened
as the sum of producer and consumer surplus, is higher for the case of a
production joint venture.
Proposition 17 Exchange is better for rms and worse for consumers when
compared to the production joint venture case. Welfare is higher in the pro-
duction joint venture case.
Proof: See above.
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5.6 Conclusion
The comparison shows that exchange will be better than no exchange al-
though rms reap all the benets. Nevertheless even with exchange the
quantities will be lower than in the production joint venture (PJV) case.
But this is not due to collusion supported through an exchange mechanism.
The dierence between exchange and a production joint venture lies in the
dierent strategic considerations rms take into account when making their
decisions. In the exchange case rms have complete information that they
will eventually compete against their exchanged quantities and they can in-
fluence this quantity. This seems plausible in concentrated oligopolistic mar-
kets with long run relationships. In the PJV case rms assume there is a low
cost structure but do not know (and can’t prevent) what the competitor will
do with the exchanged quantities. This seems more plausible in a market
where concentration and transparency is low. Firms with high cost dier-
ences would prefer an exchange agreement, rms with small cost dierences
would prefer a PJV.
An extension would be to look at a dierent mode of competion. Basi-
cally there are two types of strategic interaction: rms compete in strategic
substitutes or in strategic complements. In the rst case this corresponds to
Cournot competition with homogeneous products. The second case would
be Bertrand competition with dierentiated products.
Another aspect would be to link the asymmetric cost-structure directly
to dierent capacities. Even for identical capacities dierent capacity con-
straints and opportunity costs could arise because e.g. one rm might partly
possess monopoly power over a seperate market or the plants have dierent
breakdown or repair probabilities.
Empirically the hypothesis could be tested whether the exchanged quan-
tity e really increases the smaller the cost dierence are between rms in an
industry. In parts, the literature on strategic trade policy and international
trade look at similar questions. Intra-industry trade looks at two-way trade
in similar products but does not capture the phenomenon of inter-rm trade
and does not consider identically asymmetric cost structures. The traditional
Grubel-Lloyd index as a measure of intra-industry trade in empirical studies
is  = 1 − jx12−x21j
x12+x21
,  2 (0; 1) with higher values indicating higher inten-
sity of bilateral trade. Values xij are the quantities rm i sells on market
j and are equivalent to e in the above model. Now for any value of intra-
industry trade created solely by inter-rm trade  would be 1 and otherwise
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only change marginally. So to capture the eect of intra-industry trade in the
form of inter-rm trade one approach could be to link the actually exchanged
quantity e with cost asymmetries.
A conclusion with a policy recommendation could be as follows.
Basically a PJV and an exchange agreement are welfare enhancing. The
PJV is even better than an exchange agreement but would not always be cho-
sen voluntarily. In these cases allowing exchange agreements would increase
welfare.
The anti-trust authorities should allow production joint ventures (low-
cost structures) along the lines outlined above. They are unambiguously
welfare increasing. But in the region of very asymmetric costs (region B)
rms would not voluntarily enter a PJV. In these regions rms would still
voluntarily enter an exchange agreement. Exchange agreements are not bet-
ter in comparison to PJVs when cost asymmetry is low. If PJVs are not
allowed an exchange agreement is a second-best solution. But preferably
PJVs should always be allowed and exchange agreements should only be
allowed in the case of strong cost heterogeneity.
Chapter 6
The European Flat Glass
Market
In the subcontracting models, there has always been a direct reference to
features of the flat glass market. In the subcontracting model concerning
capacity and product variety decisions the technological and economic as-
sumptions were described in detail. Nevertheless, it seems useful to give an
overview of the flat glass market. In particular, it makes it easier to under-
stand assumptions such that there are only a few major companies competing
in strategic interaction, that due to technology only lumpy investments in
capacity are possible and that production plants have a xed capacity and
high xed costs. Adjustments in capacity can only occur incrementally. The
crucial assumption of changes in demand, in particular a slowly growing de-
mand, is one reason for capacity adjustments and a realistic feature of the
EU glass production (see the federations data from June 1999). Due to high
capacity per production plant ("tank") the overall number of plants is rel-
atively small (see the gures for 1998 and the latest published geographical
distribution from 1992). Following as an overview is the European Com-
missions description of the flat glas market when declaring a 50% stake by
Pilkington in SIV, i.e. two major companies, compatible with the common
market although concentration increased. One reason for this decision might
have been the prospect of the entry of a Japanese rm. The assessment
diers partially from the one given in the Italien flat glass decision, which
the European Court overruled and which formed the basis of the horizontal
subcontracting models. Information from federations and plant interviews
are included.
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6.1 The relevant product market and geo-
graphical reference market
Float glass is a separate product market and accounts for more than 90% of
flat glass capacity. Other types of flat glass are manufactured using dierent
production methods1.
The float glass market can be analysed at two main levels.
Level 1: production of primary, raw float glass
Level 2: raw float glass is subject to further processing (more than one
further downstream level)
6.1.1 Level 1
The relevant product market is raw or primary float glass. Raw float glass is a
homogeneous commodity type product and has no substitute for applications
at level 2. Some heterogeneity is introduced by body tinting and on-line
coating2.
The geographical reference market is the Community as a whole.
6.1.2 Level 2
Raw float glass has primarily two dierent uses: the general trade (80%),
also referred to as architectural or building glass, and the automotive trade
(20%). A survey is given in gure 6.1.
1Plate glass (Spiegelglas), sheet glass (Tafelglas), polished wire (Spiegeldrahtglas) and
patterned glass (Ornamentglas). The German expressions are given because of the spe-
cialized terminology.
2To¨nen, bzw. Online-Beschichtung.
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Figure 6.1: Flat glass market structure
General Trade Glass
More than 70% of the raw float glass in this sector is further processed.
For processed glass there are following separate relevant product markets: sil-
vered glass (10%), laminated glass (10%), toughened glass (10%) and sealed
glass (50%)3.Unprocessed glass accounts for 25% of the market.
Automotive Trade Glass
Although there are two types of safety glass in the automotive market -
laminated glass and toughened glass - , they are considered as belonging to
the same relevant product market, i.e. the market for automotive safety glass.
However, there are separate product markets for the original equipment sold
to vehicle manufacturers, that is the original equipment manufacturer (OEM)
and original equipment supply (OES), with a market share of about 85% and
3Silvered glass (verspiegeltes Glas), laminated glass (Verbundglas), toughened glass
(thermisch geha¨rtetes Glas) and sealed glass (Mehrscheiben-Isolierglas, d.h. Doppel- oder
Mehrfachglas).
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replacement equipment, that is the independent after market (IAM) with
about 15% market share. The geographical reference market for OEM/OES
and IAM automotive safety glass is Community wide.
6.2 Competition Assessment
As to the European Commission, the proposed concentration did not create
a dominant position for Pilkington/SIV either at level 1 or level 2, but might
lead to a collective dominant position between the ve major float glass
producers in the Community (especially on level 1).
6.2.1 Assessment on Level 1
Market Shares
Five producers account for 96% of the Community supply of float glass.
But the market shares are asymmetric and the level of aggregation is so large
at the community level that it dampens or masks changes in the market share
at national levels which are indicative of past competition.
According to the federation of European Glass Producers (GEPVP) the
following companies were producers of float glass in the 15 EU countries with
tanks operating at the end of 1998.
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Country Manufacturer Production Units
Belgium Glaverbal S.A. 4 tanks
Glaceries de Saint Roch S.A. 2 tanks
Holland Maasglas N.V. 1 tank
Finland Lahti 1 tank
France Saint Gobain Vitrage S.A. 2 tanks
Eurofloat S.A. (St. Gobain) 1 tank
Glaverbel France 2 tanks
Euroglas 1 tank
Germany Flachglas AG 4 tanks
Vegla (Vereinigte Glaswerke GmbH) 4 tanks
Guardian 1 tank
Tro¨sch 1 tank
Luxembourg Luxguard 1 1 tank
Luxguard 2 1 tank
Italy Saint Gobain Vetro Italia 1 tank
S.I.V. SpA 2 tanks
Flovetro SpA 1 tank
Glaverbel Italy 2 tanks
U.K. Pilkington UK Ltd. 3 tanks
Spain Cristaleria Espanola S.A. 2 tanks
Vidreria de Llodio 1 tank
Guardian Spain 1 tank
Sweden PFAB 1 tank
Portugal Covina 1 tank
Total EU 41 tanks
Product and Market Characteristics
The structural interdependence is high. The minimum ecient produc-
tion volume of a new float plant is 150 000 tonnes a year with capital costs
of about 100 million ECU and a new plant will be felt by other producers
since it is not feasible to operate at low output levels.
The mature market has an increasing overcapacity (7-22%). The elasticity
of demand is very low and a strong incentive exists to engage in cartel-like,
i.e. parallel behaviour. The nominal price of the benchmark 4 mm thick
clear float glass fell in the beginning of the 90s by 30% within 3 years and
protability of float glass producers has fallen.
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As to the federation GEPVP, other producers impacting on the EU mar-
ket with the following float tanks either existing or planned, are as follows.
Country Existing
Under construction or
denitively planned
Bielo-Russia, Russia, Ukraine 13 2 (end 1998)
Czech Republic 2
Egypt 1
Hungary 1
Israel 1
Poland 2
Romania 1
Turkey 3
New capacity in the EU is expected to be as follows.
Country Company
Capacity (T/Day)
(Under construction or
denitively planned up to 2001)
Approx.
Startup
Date
U.K. Saint-Gobain 500 end 1999
Italy Sangalli 500 (state aid under review) end 2000 ?
Spain Glaverbel/Pilkington 500 mid-2000
France Interpane 550 end 2000
Market transparency
Price transparency cannot be obtained from producer price lists, if at
all then rather from buyers. Producer links like technological product li-
cence agreements, cross-supply links4 or joint venture links are insucient or
irrelevant in this particular case to create collective dominance.
Production costs and product heterogeneity
Fixed costs amount for approximately 65% of total costs. No float glass
producer enjoys a substantial cost advantage relative to other producers.
As 70% of primary float glass is subject to further processing, research and
innovation is increasingly important as manufacturers extend the range of
value added products. Product innovation leads to product dierentiation.
New market entry is usually unlikely.
Stability of possible anti-competitive parallel behaviour seems unlikely.
There is an incentive to renege on tacit parallel behaviour (tacit price un-
derstanding) due to low variable costs and an individual price elasticity of
4Subcontracting (Querlieferbeziehungen)
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demand faced by a single rm which appears to be higher than the elasticity
of demand at the overall market level. Asymmetrical vertical integration un-
dermines the feasibility of parallel behaviour at level 1, so does new capacity.
Cross-supplies5
There is a history of cross-supplies between producers. In the beginning
of the 90s they typically varied between 3% and 7% of production volume
(for both sales and purchases) due to genuine technical reasons or urgent
small orders i.e. for tinted glass. For SIV they are large (over 60% of its
automobile glass requirements from Pilkington). In tandem with the decline
in demand in the beginning of the 90s there has been a substantial reduction
in the volume of cross-supply sales.
6.2.2 Assessment at level 2 - general trade
The supply chain to the end user is very complicated. The six float glass
producers have a combined market share of approximately 80% for silvered
glass, 60% for laminated glass, 65% for toughened glass and 30% for sealed
units. Pilkington/SIV would not acquire a dominant position. The creation
of collective dominance at level 2 is unlikely as long as there are independent
processors with signicant market share and ease of entry and as long as
there is competitive supply of raw float glass from level 1.
6.2.3 Assessment at level 2 - automotive trade
In the OEM/OES sector only the float glass producers (and Solvier) are
suppliers, in the IEM sector there are many more independent suppliers (at
least 10).
In the OEM/OES sector there is no collective dominance and no duopoly
because demand side purchasing power and excess capacity in the beginning
of the 90s (20-35% for laminated glass and 15-40% for toughened glass). In
the IAM sector there is a large number of independent suppliers and it is not
in the interest of float glass producers to weaken the position of IAM outlets.
5A dierent terminology for one-sided or two-sided subcontracting.
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6.3 Conclusion
The European Commission basically drew a favourable picture of compe-
tition in the flat glass market when deciding on the Pilkingtion/SIV case.
Concentration would likely increase in an industry which already had strong
incentives to engage in collusive behaviour. But particularly in the beginning
of the 90s, the float glass market suered from increased excess capacity and
a decline in demand, leading to price decreases of upto 30%. In the general
trade there are many independent processors and distributors downstream.
In the automotive trade vehicle manufacturers can exert considerable pur-
chasing power. In its assessment, asymmetries in the market position of the
remaining 5 float glass producers, insucient market transparency and excess
capacity would render creation and stability of possible collusive behaviour
dicult.
The description of the market explains the assumptions made particularly
for the horizontal subcontracting model. This concerns the technologically
given plant sizes, high xed costs and the need to lumpy investments when
demand changes. Furthermore, the starting point of the Italien flat glass
case, where the European Commission forbid subcontacting, is also one of
horizontal subcontracting, where one company subcontracted almost all of
its floatglass from a competitor (similarly, see SIV buying about 60% of it
automotive glass from Pilkington). Two aspects are of particular interest:
insucient market transparency, with direct relevance to information shar-
ing and signaling, and excess capacity. Both aspects were crucial in the
subcontracting models analyzed. In the case of information sharing, this is
straightforward. In the case of excess capacity, one has to remember, that the
results of the subcontracting model with capacity decisions depended on the
ratio of the demand level to plant capacity, i.e. capacity utilization. Varying
degrees of demand would lead to changes in the pattern of subcontracting,
just as the subcontracted quantities (cross-supplies) actually declined with
excess capacity.
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Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Proposition (3) (Unique sepa-
rating equilibrium)
The proof of proposition (3) will make use of Lemma (18).
Lemma 18 (Subcontracting eect):The subcontracting eect is positive if
the beliefs do not change.
Proof. @E1
@t
jce=const  0:
The subcontracting price t influences rm 1’s expected prot through
a subcontracting and an expectation eect: dE1(ci;t;c
e(t))
dt
= @E1
@t
+ @E1
@ce(t)
ce
0
(t). The subcontracting eect is straightforward. Selling the product
to the competitor at a higher price is always more protable, as long as
the competitor continues to subcontract (buy), i.e. t  1, and as long as
the expectations do not change (ce(t) = const). Then derivation yields the
subcontracting eect @E1
@t
= 1
9
(10 + 2ce + 3ci − 10t)  0 if t  1. In the
following proof it is therefore crucial to check in the belief function whether
a deviation of t changes the beliefs employed in the deviation prot (t  t)
and whether the other rm stops subcontracting (t > 1). If the beliefs do
not change and subcontracting (or not subcontracting) continues, then rm
1’s prot increases with t.
A.1.1 Separating equilibrium
The proof consists of two parts. First, take the beliefs as given. Then for
every type, deviation from the equilibrium strategies is not protable, i.e.
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the self-selection conditions 1(ci; t

i ; ci)  1(ci; t; ce(t)) (i = l; h) have to
hold for all t. Secondly, take the equilibrium strategies as given. Then the
beliefs have to be self-fullling.
1. Take the beliefs l(t) =
(
1 if t  t
0 if t > t
as given. Now look for
conditions under which none of the types will deviate.
(i) Low-cost type rm 1 (ci = cl) chooses tl.
Note that a low-cost rm’s subcontracting price tl has to be less than
1 (implying t  1). Otherwise rm 2 does not subcontract (buy) and a
low-cost rm could not successfully "separate" itself from a high-cost rm.
First consider deviations t < tl.
If t < tl  t  1 then 1(cl; tl; cl)  1(cl; t; cl) because due to Lemma
(18) deviation to a lower t < tl leads to lower prots. The Lemma can be
applied because the beliefs do not change with deviation.
Now consider deviations t > tl.
If tl < t  t  1 then 1(cl; tl; cl)  1(cl; t; cl) can only hold due to
Lemma (18) if tl  t. Furthermore, tl  t in order to signal low-costs. This
leads to the result that
tl = t
( 1) (A.1)
If tl = t
 < t  1 the beliefs ce(t) in the prot function change from cl
to ch. Now even the potentially most protable deviation at t = 1 has to be
excluded. Then 1(cl; tl; cl)  1(cl; 1; ch) if
tl  1 + cl
2
− 1
2
p
5
(
q
ch(6cl − ch)) = tmin 1 (A.2)
Then from 0  tl  1 it follows that
cl  ch  5cl (A.3)
For this range of cost parameters if 1  tl  tl min1 then deviating is not
protable. Equation (A.3) denes two boundaries of region I in gure
(2.1). (Remark: The prot dierence 1(cl; tl; cl)−1(cl; 1; ch) is a downward
sloping parabola for which the rst order conditions yield two values of tl for
zero prot dierences. In the relevant subcontracting range 0  tl  1
marginal prot dierences are positive so tl has to be larger than the lower
of the two values tmin. The condition 0  tmin  t  1 yields two border
solutions for tmin = 0 and tmin = 1. Solving for ch yields the restrictions on
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the cost parameters in equation (A.3) at which 1  tl  tmin1 holds and at
which deviation is not protable.)
If tl = t
  1 < t then because t > 1 rm 2 would not subcontract.
(Remember that the notation was dened as t = " − " if t > 1 to indicate
that no subcontracting occurs.) Then 1(cl; tl; cl)  1(cl;−; ch) if
tl  1 + cl
2
− 1
2
p
5
(
q
ch(12− ch − 6cl)) = tmin 2 (A.4)
Then from 0  tl  1 it follows that
ch  6− 3cl − 2
q
9− 9cl + c2l (A.5)
In fact, this condition need only to be checked if cl > 1. Otherwise, if
cl  1, deviating to t > 1 would end the protable subcontracting and change
beliefs from cl to the less protable ch. Deviating would therefore never be
more protable. Equation (A.5) denes the border between region II
and region III in gure (2.1).
(ii) High-cost type rm 1 (ci = ch) chooses th. First consider deviations
th < t.
If t  1 < th < t then 1(ch;−; ch)  1(ch;−; ch). In both cases no
subcontracting occurs.
If t < th < t  1 then 1(ch; th; ch)  1(ch; t; ch) can never hold due
to Lemma (18). The case th < t  1 can be excluded if th  1. The case
th > 1 was checked above and deviation was not protable. So now check for
th = 1.
If t < th = 1 < t then 1(ch; 1; ch)  1(ch;−; ch) if ch  1. This implies
If ch  1 then th = 1
If ch > 1 then th > 1:
(A.6)
The interpretation is as follows. If the production costs are low, ch  1,
charging the highest price with subcontracting, th = 1, leads to the highest
possible prot and deviating to a higher price would end protable subcon-
tracting. If production costs are high, ch > 1, subcontracting at th = 1
generates losses and deviating to a higher t > 1 would end loss-making sub-
contracting and be more protable. Therefore, a necessary condition for a
separating equilibrium with th = 1 is that ch  1.
Now consider deviations t < th.
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If t  1 < t < th then 1(ch;−; ch)  1(ch;−; ch). In both cases no
subcontracting occurs.
If t < t  1 < th then 1(ch;−; ch)  1(ch; t; ch) if
t  1 + ch
2
− 1
2
p
5
q
(12− 7ch)ch = tmax 1 (A.7)
In particular, this condition has to hold for the highest possible deviation
t at t = tmax 1 = 1. Then from t = tmax 1  1 it follows that ch  1. But
if ch < 1 then tmax 1 < t  1 would always be a protable deviation and
therefore th > 1 cannot be part of a separating equilibrium if ch < 1. It
follows that
If ch < 1 then th  1: (A.8)
If t  t  1 < th then 1(ch;−; ch)  1(ch; t; cl) if
t  1
10
(10 + 3ch + 2cl −
q
60ch − 26c2h − 18chcl + 9c2l = tmax 2 (A.9)
This always holds if
t  tmax 2
because then t  t  tmax 2. The condition t = tmax 2  1 yields
ch  1
7
(6− 3cl + 2
q
9− 9cl + 4c2l ) (A.10)
This is the region of cost parameters at which a low-cost rm has to set
its subcontracting price low enough (t  tmax 2) so that it would not be
protable for a high-cost rm to mimick the low-cost rm. Note the crucial
fact, stated in corollary , that in this cost region the price t is always less
(or equal) than 1. In other cost regions the equation always holds. Equation
(A.10) describes the border between region I and region II in gure
(2.1).
If t < t < th = 1 then 1(ch; 1; ch)  1(ch; t; ch) due to Lemma (18).
If t  t < th = 1 then 1(ch; 1; ch)  1(ch; t; cl) if
t  1
10
(10 + 3ch + 2cl −
q
34c2h − 18chcl + 9c2l = tmax 3 (A.11)
This will always hold, similar to the considerations of equation (A.9), if
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t  tmax 3
Then from 0  t  1 it follows that
ch  cl (A.12)
Necessary and sucient conditions
Equations (A.1)-(A.12) give the sucient conditions that neither a low-
cost nor a high-cost type prots from deviation.
For the low-cost type, from equations (A.1) to (A.5) it follows that
tl = t

tl  tmin 1 if cl  ch  5cl (in region I and II)
tl  tmin 2 if ch  6− 3cl − 2
q
9− 9cl + c2l (in region I and II)
Then the rst set of conditions yields
tl = t
 2 [maxftmin1; tmin2g; 1]
Making use of the fact that tmin 1  tmin 2 if cl  1 leads to the more precise
statement that
tl = t
 2
(
[tmin 1; 1] if cl  1; cl  ch  5cl (region I and IIa)
[tmin 2; 1] if cl > 1; ch  6− 3cl − 2
q
9− 9cl + c2l (region IIb)
See gure (2.1) for a picture of the regions. The regions are dened in
equation (A.15).
For the high-cost type, from equations (A.6) to (A.12) it follows that
th = 1 if ch  1 (region Ia)
th > 1 if ch > 1 (region Ib and II)
tl  tmax 2 if ch > 1; ch  17(6− 3cl + 2
q
9− 9cl + 4c2l ) (region Ib and II)
tl  tmax 3 if ch  1; cl  ch (region Ia)
Then the sucient conditions for a separating equilibrium can be sum-
marized
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tl = t
 2
8>>><>>>:
[tmin1; minftmax 3; 1g] = [tmin 1; tmax 3] if region Ia
[tmin1; minftmax 2; 1g] = [tmin 1; tmax 2] if region Ib
[tmin1; minftmax 2; 1g] = [tmin 1; 1] if region IIa
[tmin2; minftmax 2; 1g] = [tmin 2; 1] if region IIb
(A.13)
th =
(
1 if region Ia
− if otherwise (A.14)
Note that the interval boundaries depend on the cost regions because
the cost regions determine the strategies from which a deviation shall not
be protable. Take e.g. region Ia. In region Ia it holds that ch < 1 and
therefore th = 1. It is now important to realize that only deviations from
th = 1 have to be checked as being unprotable. A high-cost rm must not
have an incentive to deviate from th = 1 and e.g. set a lower price and
mimick a low-cost rm. This is checked in equation (A.11) and leads to the
condition tl  tmax 3. It is not necessary that tl  tmax 2 holds as well because
this is the condition determining when a deviation from th = − (i.e. th > 1)
is unprotable. In fact, th = − only holds if ch > 1, that is in all regions
except region Ia.
Existence
Separating equilibria exist if the price tl of a low-cost rm is an element
of a non-empty interval. This has to be checked for every interval in equation
(A.13). In region Ia a separating equilibrium cannot exist because tmin 1 >
tmax 3 if ch > cl (which is the case in region Ia) and therefore the interval
is empty. In region Ib numerical calculations show that except for a small
corner to the lower left in region Ib it always holds that tmin1 < tmax 2. In
region IIa and IIb the lower limits tmin 1 and tmin 2 are always less than 1
as this is exactly the condition determining the boundaries of these regions.
Then innitely many separating equilibria exist with prices
(tl; th) 2
8>>><>>:
([tmin 1; tmax 2] ;−) if region Ib
([tmin 1; 1] ;−) if region IIa
([tmin 2; 1] ;−) if region IIb
no offer if otherwise
Uniqueness
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The "intuitive criterion" selects the best separating equilibrium with the
highest prots for the inunformed rm. According to Lemma (18) the low-
cost rm prots increase with tl as long as the beliefs do not change. Then
the unique separating equilibrium is
(tl ; t

h) =
8>>><>>>:
(tmax 2;−) if region Ib
(1;−) if region IIa
(1;−) if region IIb
no offer if otherwise
with tmax 2 as dened in equation (A.9). The regions are shown in gure
(2.1) and are dened as
Region Ia ch  1; cl  ch  5cl
Region Ib ch > 1; cl  ch  5cl; ch  17(6− 3cl + 2
q
9− 9cl + 4c2l )
Region IIa ch >
1
7
(6− 3cl + 2
q
9− 9cl + 4c2l ); ch  6− 3cl − 2
q
9− 9cl + c2l )
Region IIb cl  ch  5cl; ch < 6− 3cl − 2
q
9− 9cl + c2l
(A.15)
The additional assumption ch < 1:5 guarantees that a high-cost rm which
does not subcontract makes positive prots and it denes the upper bound
in gure (2.1).
Firms’ equilibrium sales are given according to proposition (1).
2. Take the equilibrium strategies as given, in particular that the equi-
librium price tl is equal to the price t
 given in the belief function. Then the
beliefs are self-fullling. The low-cost type rm chooses tl = t
, leading to
beliefs that with certainty this rm is a low-cost rm, and the high-cost type
rm chooses a higher price, leading to the belief that this rm is a high-cost
rm.
A.2 Proof of Proposition (4) (Pooling Equi-
libria)
It holds that ce(t) = l(t)cl + (1 − l(t))ch. For given beliefs l(t) =(
pl if t = t

0 if t 6= t it follows that if t 6= t
 = 1 then ce(t) = ce(1) =
plcl + (1− pl)ch and ce(t) = ch. Furthermore, note that subcontracting only
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occurs at a pooling price t  1, otherwise rm 2 would prefer to produce on
its own.
1. Take the beliefs as given. Now look for conditions under which none
of the types will deviate.
(i) Low-cost type rm 1 (ci = cl) chooses t
.
If t < t  1 then 1(cl; t; ce(t))  1(cl; t; ch) can never hold for all
possible probabilities pl. Due to Lemma (18) this condition e.g. never holds
for pl = 0. It follows that
t = 1
If t < t = 1 then 1(cl; 1; ce(1))  1(cl; t; ch) if
t  tmin 1 = 110(10 + 2ch + 3cl−q
c2h(4 + 10pl − 5p2l ) + c2l (9 + 30pl − 5p2l ) + 2chcl(6− 20pl + 5p2l ))
This always holds if 1  tmin 1 which is equivalent to
cl  ch  pl − 6
pl − 2cl (A.16)
Equation (A.16) denes two boundaries of region I.
If t > t = 1 then 1(cl; 1; ce(1))  1(cl;−; ch) if
ch  1
pl(pl − 2)(cl(6−4pl + p
2
l )−2(3+
q
9 + c2l (3− 2pl)2 − 3cl(6− 4pl + p2l ))
(A.17)
Equation (A.17) denes the border between region II and region III.
(ii) High-cost type rm 1 (ci = ch) chooses t
.
If t < t = 1 then 1(ch; 1; ce(1))  1(ch; t; ch) if
t  1 + ch
2
− 1
2
p
5
q
−c2l p2l + 2chclpl(2 + pl)− c2h(−5 + 4pl + p2l ) = tmin 2
This always holds if 1  tmin 2 which is equivalent to
cl  ch (A.18)
(It is also equivalent to the irrelevant case ch  pl4+pl cl). Equation (A.18)
denes the lower boundary of region I.
If t > t = 1 then 1(ch; 1; ce(1))  1(ch;−; ch) if
ch  1
p2l + 4pl − 12
(clpl(2 + pl)− 2(3 +
q
9 + 4c2l p
2
l − 3clpl(2 + pl)) (A.19)
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Equation (A.19) denes the border between region I and region II.
In a pooling equilibrium all four equations (A.16)-(A.19) have to hold.
This is the case in region I where the upper bounds shift inward with de-
creasing probability pl:
t =
(
1 if region Ipooling
no offer if otherwise
Region Ipooling: cl  ch  pl−6pl−2cl ;
ch  1p2
l
+4pl−12(clpl(2 + pl)− 2(3 +
q
9 + 4c2l p
2
l − 3clpl(2 + pl))
(A.20)
2. For given strategies the beliefs are self-fullling. In a pooling equi-
librium the low-cost type rm and the high-cost type rm both choose t,
thereby revealing no information and leading to beliefs that rm 1 is a low-
cost type with the a priori probability pl.
Appendix B
For the basic framework for solving the prot functions see the chapter on
nonlinear programming with nonnegativity constraints in Berck/Sydsaeter
(1993). Applying this to the case of a rm producing two products x =
fx1; x2g ;x  0 in dierent plants each of capacity K, so that gi(x) = xi,
leads to
max
x
f(x) with
(
g1(x1; x2)  K
g2(x1; x2)  K (B.1)
L(x;λ) = f(x)−
2X
j=1
j(gj(x)−K)
For the vectors λ0 = (01; 
0
2) and x
0 = (x01; x
0
2) the sucient Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are:
 @L(x0;0)
@xi
= 0 , i = 1; 2
 @L(x0;0)
@j
 0 and 0j @L(x
0;0)
@0j
= 0 , j = 1; 2; 0j  0.
 the Lagrangean function L(x;λ) is a concave function of x.
Then x0 solves the problem (B.1).
Most of the calculations and graphics were done with Mathematica.
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B.1 Duopoly without subcontracting
B.1.1 Prot functions
The market size of product x is a1, the market size of product y is a2.
Case (f,f)
Firm 1 produces product x in one plant and rm 2 produces product y
in one plant. Due to symmetry x1 = y2 and 
x;y
1 = 
x;y
2 . Solving explicitly,
at least for this case, leads to the prot functions
x;y1 = (a1 − x1)x1 − (x1 −K)
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
a1 − 2x1 −  = 0
−(x1 −K)  0 and −(x1 −K) = 0
If the capacity constraint is not binding, that is if  = 0, then the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions lead to x1 =
a1
2
and K  x1 = a12 . In summary:
If a1
2
 K then rm 1 is not capacity constrained. Optimal quantities
and prots are x1 =
a1
2
and x;y1 = (
a1
2
)2.
If a1
2
> K then rm 1 is capacity constrained, x1 = K and 
x;y
1 = (a1 −
K)K.
Then for the example K = 1; a1 = a2 = a it holds that
f = x;y1 = 
x;y
2 =
(
(a
2
)2 if 0 < a  2
a− 1 if 2 < a
Case (g,h)
Firm 1 produces products x and y in one plant and rm 2 produces
product y in one plant.
If a1
2
+ a2
3
 K neither of the two rms is capacity constrained. Then
(x1; y1; y2) = (
a1
2
; a2
3
; a2
3
) , xy;y1 = (
a1
2
)2 + (a2
3
)2 − Fw and xy;y2 = (a23 )2:
If 1
9
(a1 + 3a2)  K < a12 + a23 only rm 1 is capacity constrained. Then
(x1; y1; y2) = (
1
7
(2a1 − a2 + 3K); 17(a2 − 2a1 + 4K); 17(a1 + 3a2 − 2K))
xy;y1 =
1
49
(8a21 − 8a1a2 + 2a22 + 17a1K + 16a2K − 17K2)− Fw
xy;y2 =
1
49
(a1 + 3a2 − 2K)2
If K < 1
9
(a1 + 3a2) both rms are capacity constrained. Then
(x1; y1; y2) = (
1
4
(a1 − a2 + 3K); 14(a2 − a1 + K); K)
xy;y1 =
1
8
((a1 − a2)2 + 6a1K + 2a2K − 7K2)− Fw
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xy;y2 =
1
4
(a1 + 3a2 − 5K)K
Then for the example K = 1; a1 = a2 = a it holds that
g = xy;y1 =
8><>:
13
36
a2 − Fw if 0 < a  65
1
49
(33a + 2a2 − 17)− Fw if 65 < a  94
a− 7
8
− Fw if 94 < a
h = xy;y2 =
8><>:
a2
9
if 0 < a  6
5
1
49
(4a− 2)2 if 6
5
< a  9
4
a− 5
4
if 9
4
< a
Case (k,k)
Firm 1 and Firm 2 have one plant each and produce both products in
their plant. Due to symmetry x1 = x2, y1 = y2 and 
xy;xy
1 = 
xy;xy
2 .
If a1+a2
3
 K neither of the two rms is capacity constrained. Then
(x1; y1) = (
a1
3
; a2
3
) and xy;xy1 = (
a1
3
)2 + (a2
3
)2 − Fw:
If K < a1+a2
2
both rms are capacity constrained. Then
(x1; y1) = ((
1
6
(a1 − a2 + 3K); 16(a2 − a1 + 3K))
xy;xy1 =
1
18
(a1 − a2)2 + 12(a1 + a2)K −K2 − Fw
Then for the example K = 1; a1 = a2 = a it holds that
k = xy;xy1 = 
xy;xy
2 =
(
2
9
a2 − Fw if 0 < a  32
a− 1− Fw if 32 < a
Case (m,l)
Firm 1 produces product x in one plant and product y in a second plant
and rm 2 produces products x and y in one plant.
If a1+a2
3
 K then neither of the two rms is capacity constrained. Then
(x1; y1; x2; y2) = (
a1
3
; a2
3
; a1
3
; a2
3
)
xy;x;y1 = (
a1
3
)2 + (a2
3
)2 − Fn
xy;x;y2 = (
a1
3
)2 + (a2
3
)2 − Fw.
If 5a1+a2
15
< K; a1+5a2
15
< K; K < a1+a2
3
then only rm 2 is capacity con-
strained.
(x1; y1; x2; y2) = (
5a1+a2−3K
12
; a1+5a2−3K
12
; a1−a2+3K
6
; a2−a1+3K
6
)
xy;x;y1 =
1
144
(5a1 + a2 − 3K)2 + 1144(a1 + 5a2 − 3K)2 − Fn
xy;x;y2 =
1
18
(a1 − a2)2 + 14K(a1 + a2 −K)− Fw
If a1+a2
4
> K; 3a1+a2
10
> K; a1+3a2
10
> K then both rms are capacity con-
strained in each plant. Then
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(x1; y1; x2; y2) = (K; K;
a1−a2+2K
4
; a2−a1+2K
4
)
xy;x;y1 = (a1 + a2 − 3K)K − Fn
xy;x;y2 =
1
8
((a1 − a2)2 + 4(a1 + a2 − 12K)K)− Fw
Then for the example K = 1; a1 = a2 = a it holds that
m = xy;x;y1 =
8>><>>:
2a2
9
− Fn if 0 < a  32
(2a−1)2
8
− Fn if 32 < a  52
2a− 3− Fn if 52 < a
l = xy;x;y2 =
8><>:
2a2
9
− Fw if 0 < a  32
2a−1
4
− Fw if 32 < a  52
a− 3
2
− Fw if 52 < a
Case (n,o)
Firm 1 produces product x in one plant and product y in one plant and
rm 2 produces product y in one plant.
If K  a1
2
; K  a2
3
then neither rm is capacity constrained. Then
(x1; y1; y2) = (
a1
2
; a2
3
; a2
3
), x;y;y1 =
a21
4
+
a22
9
− Fn and x;y;y2 = a
2
2
9
.
If K < a1
2
; K  a2
3
then rm 1 is capacity constrained only with product
x. Then (x1; y1; y2) = (K;
a2
3
; a2
3
), x;y;y1 =
a22
9
+ a1K −K2 − Fn and x;y;y2 =
a22
9
.
"Degenerate" cases will be omitted. The case that rm 1 is capacity
constrained in both plants and rm 2 is not capacity constrained can not
arise. This would necessitate a
3
> K  a
3
, a contradiction.
If a1
2
> K; a2
3
> K then both rms are capacity constrained in every
plant. Then (x1; y1; y2) = (K; K; K), 
x;y;y
1 = a1K + a2K − 3K2 − Fn and
x;y;y2 = a2K − 2K2.
Then for the example K = 1; a1 = a2 = a it holds that
n = x;y;y1 =
8><>:
13a2
36
− Fn if 0 < a  2
a2
9
+ a− 1− Fn if 2 < a  3
2a− 3− Fn if 3 < a
o = x;y;y2 =
8><>:
a2
9
if 0 < a  2
a2
9
if 2 < a  3
a− 2 if 3 < a
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Case (p,p)
Each rm has two plants and produces product x and y in one plant each.
Due to symmetry x1 = x2; y1 = y2 and 
x;y;x;y
1 = 
x;y;x;y
2 .
If K  a1
3
; K  a2
3
then neither rm is capacity constrained and (x1; y1) =
(a1
3
; a2
3
) and x;y;x;y1 =
1
9
(a21 + a
2
2)− Fn:
If a1
3
> K; a2
3
> K then both rms are capacity constrained in each plant.
Then (x1; y1) = (K; K) and 
x;y;x;y
1 = a1K + a2K − 4K2 − Fn
Then for the example K = 1; a1 = a2 = a it holds that
p = x;y;x;y1 = 
x;y;x;y
2
(
2a2
9
− Fn if 0 < a  3
2a− 4− Fn if 3 < a
B.1.2 Critical levels of demand
The critical level of demand ai in table 4.1.2 are calculated for the example
with xed costs Fn = 0:25 and Fw = 0:1. The intersection of two prot
functions can be seen graphically and determines those parts of the prot
functions which are relevant for calculating the critical demand levels.
g = f if a1 = 3
p
Fw = 0:94868 with 0 < a  65
m = k if a2 =
3
2
−p2pFn − Fw = 2:04772 with 32 < a  52
p = l if a3 =
3
8
(3 +
q
1 + 32(Fn − Fw)) = 2:02812 with 32 < a  52
k = h if a4 = a1 with 0 < a  65
Firms increase capacity at the same demand levels if a2 > a3, which when
solving for xed costs is equivalent to Fw < Fn < Fw +
9
50
. Firms increase
capacity at dierent demand levels if Fn  Fw + 950 .
B.1.3 Assumptions about xed costs
Two two assumptions about xed costs help circumvent some technical dif-
culties without changing any basic results.
The rst assumption is that the xed costs of building the rst plant are
sunk. The starting point is that of each rm operating one plant. The focus is
not on entry decisions of rms into markets but of adjustment and expansion
decisions of rms already operating in a market and considering the "entry"
of new plants. From a technical point this eliminates the problem of having
two asymmetric equilibria on a demand interval. If costs are not sunk, the
prot functions f , k and p in gure 4.1 would shift downward by the amount
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of xed costs. At the critical demand level a1 it would be a dominant strategy
of rms to produce both products and equilibrium prots would change from
f to k even if k were negative. This does not seem plausible. Instead of
making losses rms can always stop producing products, the strategy space
should be enlarged and include the possibility of producing nothing. Then, as
long as prot k is negative, there would be two asymmetric equilibria, where
one rm, e.g. rm 1, produces both products and the other rm produces
no products. In this demand interval, in equilibrium rm 1 would earn
monopoly prots for two products and rm 2’s prots would be zero. When
looking at the adjustment process for a slowly growing demand (or more
correctly the comparative statics of dierent demand levels), this would lead
to the implausible result, that rm 2 would rst produce one product, then
none, then two products. If the xed costs of the rst plant are sunk, prots
k(a1) > 0 and this problem does not arise. Firms gradually extend their
product line.
The second assumption, Fw < Fn < Fw +
9
50
, guarantees that a2 > a3
and that there are no technical diculties in the adjustment process similar
to the ones described above. If instead Fn  Fw + 950 , that is a2  a3, there
would again be two asymmetric equilibria. Only one rm, e.g. rm 1, would
at demand a2 increase its capacity by one plant. Firm 1 would increase its
output substantially because both rms were capacity constrained before.
The higher the xed costs of building a new plant, the less inclined will rm
2 be to increase its capacity as well. For the demand interval (a2; a3) there
will be an asymmetric equilibrium. This is the case where Fw = 0:05 instead
of Fw = 0:1. Then a2 = 2:13246 < a3 = 2:14511 and for the small range of
demand [a1; a2) rm 1 would be the only company increasing its capacity.
B.2 Duopoly with subcontracting
The steps for determining the optimal quantities, prices and prots were
outlined in section 4.1.3. Here, the case (gs; hs) will be described in detail,
for the similar cases (ns; os) and (ms; ls) only the results will be given.
Case (gs,hs)
The prot of rm 1 is gs, the prot of rm 2 is hs. Firm 1 produces
products x and y in one plant and rm 2 produces product y in one plant.
In the third stage of the game rms determine the optimal quantities and
the Lagrangean parameters by solving equations 4.1. They are dierent for
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each of the three capacity cases where either no rm, rm 1 or both rms
are capacity constrained.
No rm is capacity constrained: (x1; y1; s; y2) = (
a+t
3
; a
3
; a−2t
3
; a
3
)
Only rm 1 is capacity constrained:
(x1; y1; s; y2; l1) = (
6−3a+5t
9
; 6−3a+2t
9
; 6a−3−7t
9
; 6a−3−t
9
; a− 1− t
3
)
Both rms are capacity constrained:
(x1; y1; s; y2; l1; l2) = (
3(2−a+t)
5
; 2−a+t
5
; 4a−3−4t
5
; 1; 7a−9−2t
5
; 6a−12−t
5
)
In the second stage of the game rm 1 chooses the subcontracting price
by solving equations 4.2 for each of the three capacity cases. Basically, rm
1 solves
max
t
gs(t) s:t: hs(t) 
8><>:
fno cc if 0  a < a1
kno cc if a1  a < 1:5
kfirm 1 cc if 1:5  a
No rm is capacity constrained: t =
8<:
2+
p
5a
4
if 0  a < a1
a−
p
a2−9Fw
2
if a1  a < 1:5
Only rm 1 is capacity constrained:
t =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
− (because l1 < 0) if 0  a < a1
3
50
(−8 + 16a−p2
q
−18 + 72a− 22a2 − 225Fw) if a1  a < 1:5
but l1 > 0 only if a > 1:09
3
50
(−8 + 16a− 3p2
q
−27 + 33a− 8a2 − 25Fw) if 1:5  a
Both rms are capacity constrained
t =
(
1
32
(−19 + 32a +
q
425− 1600Fw) if 1:5  a;
but l1;l2 > 0 only if a > 2:18
The Lagrangean parameters, l1 and l2, have to be positive if one or both
rms are to be capacity constrained when subcontracting. So a price, cal-
culated under the assumption that a rm was capacity constrained, has to
be inserted into the functions of l1 (and l2) to endogenously check whether
the rm actually is capacity constrained at the relevant demand region. In
summary, the critical demand levels and the appropriate prot functions are
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Demand Prot without sub. Prot with sub.
0  a < a1 = 0:95 fno cc gs no cc
a1  a < 1:09 kno cc "
1:09  a < 1:5 " gs firm 1 cc
1:5  a < 2:18 kboth firms cc "
2:18  a " gs both firms cc
For demand region 0  a < a1 rm 1 would not choose a price. It
would prefer not to make any oer because its prot with subcontracting
gs no cc would be lower than its prot without subcontracting fno cc. Thus,
the optimal subcontracting price t is
t =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
no offer if 0  a < a1
a−
p
a2−9Fw
2
if a1  a < 1:09
3
50
(−8 + 16a−p2
q
−18 + 72a− 22a2 − 225Fw) if 1:09  a < 1:5
3
50
(−8 + 16a− 3p2
q
−27 + 33a− 8a2 − 25Fw) if 1:5  a < 2:18
The optimal subcontracting price is now inserted into the reduced form
prot function of the appropriate capacity case. At demand levels a1 < a <
1:09 this is the prot function gs no cc where no rm is capacity constrained,
at demand levels 1:09  a < 2:18 it is the prot function gs firm 1 cc where
only rm 1 is capacity constrained.
Case (ns,os)
Firm 1 produces product x in one plant and product y in one plant and
rm 2 produces product y in one plant. In the third stage of the game rms
determine the optimal quantities and the Lagrangean parameters by solving
equations 4.3 and in the second stage of the game rm 1 chooses the optimal
subcontracting price by solving equations 4.4.
No rm is capacity constrained: (x1; y1; s; y2) = (
a+t
3
; a
3
; a−2t
3
; a
3
)
t =
8<: a−
p
−9+9a−a2−9Fw
2
if 1:5  a < a2 = 2:05
but t < 0 if a > 1:91
Firm 1 is capacity only for product x:
(x1; y1; s; y2; l1) = (2− a + t; a3 ; a− 1− t; a3 ; 2a− 3− t)
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t =
8>>><>>>:
a− 1−
p
−9+9a−a2−9Fw
3
if 1:5  a < a2 = 2:05
but l1 > 0 only if a > 1:56
a− 1−
p
a2−9Fn
3
if a2  a
Both rms are capacity constrained only at demand levels a  3:
Then optimal prices are
t =
8>>>><>>>>:
a−
p
−9+9a−a2−9Fw
2
if 1:5  a < 1:56
a− 1−
p
−9+9a−a2−9Fw
3
1:56  a < a2
a− 1−
p
a2−9Fn
3
if a2  a
Case (ms,ls)
Firm 1 produces product x in one plant and product y in a second plant
and rm 2 produces products x and y in one plant. The demand region
of particular interest is 1:56  a < a2, where the in case (ns,os) rm 1
with subcontracting would be capacity constrained. Here, for any positive
subcontracting price, the case were only rm 2 is capacity constrained would
apply:
(x1; y1; s; x2; y2; l1) = (
a+t
3
; a+t
3
; 2a−3−4t
3
; 3−a+2t
3
; a−2t
3
; t) and
t =
8<:
−9+8a+p−207+144a
16
if 1:5  a < a2 = 2:05; but ms < m
−9+8a−
p
81−144a+64a2−288Fn+288Fw
16
if a2  a; now ms > m
The case where rm 1 is capacity constrained with product x and rm 2
is capacity constrained can only arise at demand levels a > 2:19. The case
where both rms are capacity constrained with both products can only arise
at demand levels a > 2:23. This means that the product-plant combination
(ms,ls) leads to the same results as the combination (ns,os). Firm 1 has no
incentive to subcontract at demand levels at which consumer would have
beneted from subcontracting.
Appendix C
Region Firm 1 Firm 2 Exchange
3 x; y x; y y1  er , x2  e
6 x; y y y1  er , x2 = e
2 x x; y y1 =
e
r
, x2  e
5 x y y1 =
e
r
, x2 = e
8 x y y1 =
e
r
, x2  e
4 x y y1  er , x2 = e
7 x y y1  er , x2  e
9 x; y y y1  er , x2  e
1 x x; y y1  er , x2  e
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